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ABSTRACT 
China’s economic growth and military modernization over the past decade presents a 
foreign policy challenge to Southeast Asia. The balance of power in Asia, so long 
dominated by the U.S., is beginning a shift toward China. At the same time, China is 
growing more assertive toward its neighbors. This thesis seeks to explain how Singapore 
and Vietnam are reacting to this change. Using the existing literature and the historic 
example of Finland’s policies in the last century, it presents alignment behavior as a 
negotiating process between states. These negotiations are both constrained and driven by 
realist concerns, existing institutions and domestic politics, which affect the speed and the 
form that changing relationships and alignments take. Presented in this manner, this 
theory offers two distinct explanations for the policies of Vietnam and Singapore. In 
Vietnam, the concern over the threat of China, coupled with a lingering mistrust of the 
United States, has led to a distributed balancing approach that spreads Vietnam’s security 
reliance among a number of regional powers. In Singapore, the limited threat China 
presents and the resolution of other regional threats relaxes the need to balance and 
enables Singapore to view the rise of China as an opportunity. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
China’s rapid economic growth and military modernization over the past decade 
presents a foreign policy challenge to the nations of Southeast Asia. The balance of 
power in Asia, so long dominated by the U.S. presence, is beginning a shift toward 
China, aided by its growing strength and physical proximity. At the same time, China has 
recently begun to diverge from its early efforts at a charm offensive and is growing more 
assertive and demanding toward its neighbors. This thesis seeks to explain how two 
specific states in Southeast Asia, Singapore and Vietnam, are reacting to this change.  
While traditional international relations theories offer various predictions on how 
these states will respond to this challenge, the real world response is less distinctly 
defined. Traditional theories of alliance formation that sought to explain the behaviors of 
Western Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries are less applicable to small 
states in today’s interdependent world. In the post–Cold War world, alignment between 
states has replaced formal alliance as the black and white nature of the bipolar world has 
been replaced by a more fluid international structure. This allows for a greater range of 
options for small states to engage with the larger powers. Additionally, most of the 
theories frame the discussion on the behavior of small states as a stark choice between 
balancing and bandwagoning that can be implemented or switched instantaneously. 
While this type of switch does happen in certain circumstances, it is atypical of how 
states shift alignment in general.  
This thesis seeks to provide a more fine-grained and nuanced analysis of the 
behavior of these states by drawing on a broad mix of international relations theory 
ranging from structural realism to neoliberal institutionalism to the second order effects 
of domestic politics. Using the existing literature and the historic example of Finland’s 
policies of the last century, it presents alignment behavior as a negotiating process 
between states. These negotiations are both constrained and driven by realist concerns, 
existing institutions and domestic politics, which affect the speed and the form that 
changing relationships and alignments take. Presented in this manner, this theory offers 
two distinct explanations for the foreign policies of Vietnam and Singapore. In Vietnam, 
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the real concern with the threat of China coupled with a lingering mistrust of the United 
States has led to a distributed balance approach that spreads Vietnam’s security reliance 
among a number of regional powers. In Singapore, the limited threat China presents and 
the resolution of other regional threats removes the need to balance and enables 
Singapore to view the rise of China as an opportunity. 
A. IMPORTANCE  
American relative strength, so dominant at the end of the Cold War, is on the 
decline and the unipolar international system that it created is giving way to increasing 
multi-polarity at the regional level. This change in the international structure will require 
states to reconsider and potentially alter their existing relationships with other states. In 
this context, answering the question of how states establish new allegiances and decouple 
themselves from existing ones in order to balance against a threat has several important 
applications. It offers depth to existing international relations theory, especially structural 
theories, that often treat alliances between states as a switch in allegiance that is 
immediately transferred from one to the other. This depth can provide better 
understanding of the process and not just the results, which then facilitates predictive 
analysis and can influence policy. By analyzing the process in previous case studies, it 
may be possible to predict how states may behave in the future or what current behavior 
indicates about the strength of relations between two states. Additionally, understanding 
which types of relationships between states (diplomatic, ideological, military or 
economic) are ‘stickiest’ may allow policy makers to prevent or reverse alliance shifts by 
emphasizing those types of relationships. 
The rise of China presents the United States with one of its most difficult foreign 
policy challenges since the end of the Cold War. The United States must successfully 
manage not only its relationship with China but also with those states that are 
increasingly influenced by China. To do this, policy makers must understand how 
reactions to this new influence will manifest into state behavior. The two states in 
question are particularly important. If Singapore’s growing economic relationship with 
China is the first stage in a shift in alignment away from the United States and toward 
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China, it presents a potentially grave picture for the U.S. alliance structure in Asia. 
Singapore has been a long-time friend of the United States and an important security 
partner, so if China’s rising power is capable of undoing those strong ties it certainly has 
the potential to unravel America’s less substantial links to other states in the region. 
Singapore is also a lynchpin in the U.S. security structure in the Pacific. It provides 
maintenance facilities for U.S. Naval vessels and is home to the Navy’s logistics 
command, COMLOGWESTPAC, which provides logistics support for Navy and Marine 
Corps forces operating in the Seventh Fleet AOR. Losing access to these facilities would 
require a large-scale restructuring of the Navy’s logistics and support system in the 
western Pacific. 
While Vietnam’s relationship with the United States is newer and lacks the 
existing military importance of Singapore, its influence in the region is growing stronger. 
The economic reforms implemented in the 1980s and its growing participation in 
ASEAN since the 1990s has given Vietnam a larger role in Southeast Asian decision 
making. Its behavior and alignment choices could influence its weaker neighbors such as 
Cambodia and Laos. Vietnam is also presented with a different set of challenges in 
managing its alignment than Singapore. Its geographic proximity and history of conflict 
with China create additional constraints on Vietnamese foreign policy. By examining 
how Vietnam is managing its relationships in the face of those challenges, a 
determination can be made about how they either accelerate changes in alignment by 
increasing the threat that needs to be balanced against or decelerate changes in alignment 
through fear of retribution.  
While the focus of this thesis is on Asia, this analysis can provide a more general 
approach that has broader applications. The growing strength of regional powers such as 
Russia, India, Brazil and even the European Union may present states in these regions 
with new, potentially more palatable, alternatives to the U.S.-dominated system. The 
lessons learned by understanding how Singapore and Vietnam are managing their foreign 
relations in response to China’s increasing power, and contrasting them with historical 
examples, can provide insight into how these other regions may react and provide 
potential avenues for other research.  
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B. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS 
The following section will discuss the prevailing theories concerning when and 
how alliances form from three different analytical perspectives, realism, neoliberal 
institutionalism and domestic political influence. After those examinations, the following 
section will use the theories presented to develop a hypothesis that addresses how 
balancing behavior may actually manifest itself in a state’s foreign policy and what 
factors may constrain or promote those changes. 
1. Formation of Alliances 
Most international relations theories are intended to explain how states deal with 
anarchy. For realists and neorealists alike, that anarchy can only be overcome by 
achieving a balance. Realists typically argue that states will engage in internal balancing 
or ally themselves with other states to offset or balance against a more powerful state.1  
Stephen Walt adds additional conditions that influence a states balancing and 
bandwagoning behavior. According to Walt, states are inclined to balance or bandwagon, 
not in response to power alone, but in response to external threats, of which power is only 
one factor. The additional factors that Walt believes influence a state’s perception of 
threat include geographic proximity, the offensive nature of the power and a state’s 
intentions. The closer a state is, the more offensive its weapons are, and the more 
aggressive it is perceived, the more likely it is to inspire alliances, either with it or against 
it. 2 
Walt concludes that, in general, states are more likely to ally with other states in 
order to balance against a perceived threat but they may bandwagon under specific 
conditions. He identifies three factors that encourage bandwagoning. 1) Weaker states are 
more likely to bandwagon because they are more vulnerable to aggression from the 
threatening state and they do not have the strength to determine their own fate. 2) States 
                                                 
1 Hans J. Morganthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th ed. (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc, 1973); George Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependance 
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968); Kenneth M. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Long 
Grove, IL: Waveland Press, Inc, 2010), 113–28. 
2 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), 21–26. 
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with few, if any, potential alliance partners are more likely to partner with the threatening 
state. 3) States with less aggressive intentions are more likely to trigger bandwagoning 
because others will believe that by allying with the threatening state it can appease the 
threat and avoid harm.3 
Randall Schweller treats the concept of balancing and bandwagoning differently. 
He claims that the concepts are not opposite reactions to the same stimulus, an increase in 
threat, but are instead two different strategies that states adopt depending on their goals. 
A state whose primary goal is security is more likely to balance and a state whose 
primary goal is profit is more likely to bandwagon. This separates states into those who 
are satisfied with the status-quo and those who are not. Status-quo states exposed to 
significant external threats are more likely to balance against the rising threat because 
their goal is security. Revisionist states are more likely to bandwagon regardless of the 
presence of a threat. In fact, Schweller asserts, “revisionist powers are the prime movers 
of alliance behavior. In the absence of a reasonable external threat, states need not, and 
typically do not, engage in balancing.”4 
A combination of the theories of Walt and Schweller is especially useful in the 
cases of Singapore and Vietnam. Schweller’s assertion that states do not balance except 
in the presence of a significant external threat helps to explain the broad foreign policies 
pursued by both states in the decade after the Cold War. As will be discussed in the later 
chapters concerning each of these states, both Vietnam and Singapore, through their 
growing integration in the global economy are decidedly status-quo powers, which means 
that, when confronted with a specific threat, as defined by Walt, both states are likely to 
balance against that threat. It should be assumed then that as the threat from China grows, 
both Vietnam and Singapore would be expected to move closer in alignment with a 
balancing power.  
What these theories do not address is how nations pursue alignment with a 
balancing power. The next section will address that issue. 
                                                 
3 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 172–78. 
4  Randall L. Schweller. “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In.” 
International Security 19, no. 1 (Summer 1994): 72–107.  
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2. Alignment Processes 
Whereas the previous section discussed the conditions that led to the initiation or 
alignments, treating these arrangements as instantaneous processes, this section will 
discuss the processes that lead to the formation of alliances. By examining the historical 
cases from 1879 to 1914, Glen Snyder analyzes the formation alliances and the factors 
that contribute to the character of these commitments, characterizing the formation of 
these alliances as a bargaining process between two or more states. His analysis shows 
that the alliance negotiations during this period were preceded by “a period of overtures 
and probes, apparently intended both to ascertain whether an agreement was possible and 
to accustom governments and public opinion to its prospects.”5  These overtures included 
diplomatic exchanges, loans, military exchanges and exercises, as well as sharing of 
technology. He describes these as a way of breaking up the formation of an alliance into 
smaller steps that are easier for both states to accept.6   
His examination concludes that maintaining the balance of power is the dominant 
motivation in alliance formation, but that negotiations are typically finalized due to a 
specific threatening event or the failure of negotiations for an alternative arrangement. 
Without such motivation, states may be inhibited from forming alliances by concerns 
over provoking other states or to avoid settling while a number of options are still 
available to them.7  He claims that the flexibility of the multi-polar system during the 
time period analyzed was not as significant as is commonly held, so states had few, if 
any, alternatives for alliance partners, which accounts for the limited ambiguity in the 
selection of alliance partners during that period. By inference, one could assume that an 
environment with few threats and a greater availability of partners would also account for 
a greater ambiguity and more flexibility.  
The decline of the Soviet Union allowed just this type of flexibility in Asia. 
Without the presence of an identifiable external threat, Singapore and Vietnam have been 
                                                 
5  Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 155. 
6  Ibid. 
7  Ibid., 1–5, 142–46. 
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allowed to pursue external relationships with few external restrictions imposed on them 
and without the need to settle on one in particular partner. The economic and diplomatic 
behavior exhibited by both states during this time can be seen as a milder form of the 
type of overtures described by Snyder as prenegotiating behavior, a way of exploring 
their alternatives and testing out the diplomatic water during a period when their actions 
would not be viewed as especially provocative. 
Snyder then examines how, once established, states maintain their alliances. He 
characterizes this maintenance as an ongoing negotiation in order to avoid being 
“abandoned” or “entrapped” in which bargaining power is defined by dependence on, and 
commitment to, the alliance. He defines dependence as a comparison of the benefits a 
state receives from the alliance and the benefits available from an alternative source, 
either through another ally or by developing a state’s own capacity. Commitment is 
defined as “an arrangement of values that disposes one to act in a certain way.”   
Increased dependence on, or commitment to, an alliance reduces a state’s bargaining 
power, increasing the chance of entrapment and limiting its options when threatened with 
abandonment.8  While Snyder’s work is based on military alliances, many of the same 
ideas about bargaining can be applied to patterns of alignment. Both are driven by threats, 
as well as shared interests and issues. As Snyder states, “alliances are simply one of the 
behavioral means to create or strengthen alignments.”9  Certainly the lack of formality in 
an alignment increases the fluidity of the relationship and provides more opportunities for 
abandonment than entrapment but states must still manage those relations in a similar 
manner. 
3. Constraints on Alignment 
While the above theories have outlined the motivations for alignment, states do 
not always act as these theories predict. If, as Walt states above, states balance in 
response to threat then the first thing that may lead to a failure to balance as predicted is 
ambiguity in the threat environment or an inability to correctly identify a threat. 
                                                 
8  Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 165–69, 307–08. 
9  Ibid., 8. 
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Identification of a threat requires understanding not only capabilities but also intentions. 
It is the later that presents difficulties for states attempting to determine if their neighbor 
is a threat. This is particularly true for both Singapore and Vietnam. China’s capabilities 
are clearly documented, but it is less well understood what their intentions are. Another 
aspect of threat that may delay balancing behavior can be derived by unpacking some of 
the criteria that Walt lays out for bandwagoning behavior. By looking at bandwagoning 
for security as a type of indefinitely delayed balancing behavior, one can also say that an 
imminent, proximate and clearly defined external threat can severely hinder a state’s 
balancing behavior through coercion. 
When alignment is viewed as a negotiating process between states, as discussed 
by Snyder, there are several internal and external factors can also constrain states from 
making the types of alignments that most serve their interests. Internally, domestic factors 
can play a part in the alignment choices states make. This is argued primarily in 
association with large democratic powers due to their greater room for error and open 
political debate. In his book length work, Weak States in the International System, 
Michael Handel dismisses the importance of domestic politics on the foreign policy of 
weak states in the first page of the introduction stating: 
Domestic determinants of foreign policy are less salient in weak states. 
The international system leaves them less room for choice in the decision-
making process. Their small margin of error and hence greater 
preoccupation with survival makes the essential interests of weak states 
less ambiguous.10 
The cases of concern in this thesis, particularly Vietnam, present an important 
challenge to that statement, and so these factors must also be addressed in analyzing these 
states behaviors. There are two obvious ways that domestic politics can influence 
alignment choices. Regime change within a state, either through the violent overthrow of 
a government or the peaceful turnover in power can result in potentially drastic changes 
in a state’s international orientation. Political infighting within a state can also result in 
changes in alignment choices when domestic political groups use a proposed alignment 
                                                 
10  Michael D. Handel, Weak States in the International System (Jerusalem: Routledge 1981), 3. 
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as a political issue, attacking it as unfair, unequal or unnecessary as a way of 
differentiating themselves from the dominant political groups.11  Steven David has 
argued that third world states with weak central control are particularly susceptible to 
internal threats. In a concept he calls omni-balancing, he claims that these states are 
driven by balance of threat, but, when internal threats to legitimacy outweigh the external 
threats they will choose alignments that allow them to shore up their legitimacy first.12  
This argument is particularly interesting in the context of Vietnam where internal 
legitimacy is increasingly tied to economic growth.  
External constraints can also influence a state’s balancing behavior. Existing 
institutions with multiple partners can make it difficult for states to clearly choose one 
alignment option over another. Ikenberry argues that “institutions are sticky—they can 
take on a life and logic of their own, shaping and constraining even the states that create 
them.”13  He provides two explanations for this. The first is that the startup cost for 
creating a new institution is prohibitive and gains from an alternative institution must be 
“overwhelmingly greater before they overcome the sunk cost of the existing 
institutions.”14  The second is that institutions are entrenched by the mutual obligations 
and commitments of the parties involved, which are difficult to reverse.15  Walt argues 
this same point from a less theoretical perspective, arguing that bureaucratic elements 
become increasingly tied to the existing arrangement and will tend to resist change.16  
These arguments are succinctly summed up by Lisa Martin who stated, “Because new 
institutions are costly to create, because actors are risk averse, and because of increasing 
returns to scale, institutions will show some staying power, even in the face of changes in 
fundamental variables.”17 
                                                 
11  Walt, “Why Alliances Endure or Collapse,” 161–163. 
12 Steven R. David, “Explaining Third World Alignment,” World Politics 43, (January, 1991). 
13  G. John Ikenberry, “Strategic Restraint, and the Persistance of the American Postwar Order,” 
International Security 23, no. 3 (Winter 1998–1999): 68. 
14  Ibid., 72. 
15  Ibid. 
16  Walt, “Why Alliances Endure or Collapse,” 166–167. 
17  Lisa L. Martin, “An Institutionalist View,” in International Order and the Fuure of World Politics, 
eds. John A. Hall and T. V. Paul (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 82. 
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These theories typically focus on broader international institutions such as the 
World Trade Organization, the United Nations or NATO but the bilateral institutions 
established between states that create diplomatic, economic or military cooperation can 
also be subject to this institutional inertia. Because both Singapore and Vietnam have 
been allowed such latitude in their foreign policies by the open international structure of 
the past two decades, they have a developed number of informal economic, diplomatic, 
and to a lesser degree, security institutions with multiple countries. A formal or more 
concrete choice of alignment would require them to extricate themselves from some of 
these institutions and would slow the process of balancing as the states worked to 
establish alternative arrangements that would provide the same benefits. 
4. Existing Theories on Southeast Asia 
The dominant theories on Southeast Asia’s international relations combine both 
the realist and neoliberal theories into a strategy that is commonly referred to as hedging. 
At present, the two greatest influences in Asia are the United States and China, but the 
lack of any outright hostilities between the two nations makes application any one of the 
types of alliance theories outlined above difficult at best and a review of the scholarly 
work on this subject confirms this difficulty. A significant portion of the most recent 
work describes Southeast Asian country’s foreign policy as incorporating two primary 
goals. The countries there are attempting to engage China economically and 
diplomatically to facilitate the PRC’s integration into the existing system and to avoid 
alienating it while simultaneously maintaining security ties with the United States to 
facilitate stability in the region. These strategies are often characterized as “hedging.”18  
Evelyn Goh explains this policy in a slightly different way. Describing it as omni-
enmeshment, she claims that Southeast Asia is attempting to involve all of the regional 
powers in the affairs of Southeast Asia to “deepen their sense of having a stake in the  
 
                                                 
18  Kuik Cheng-Chwee, “The Essence of Hedging: Malaysia and Singapore’s Response to a Rising 
China,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 30, no. 2 (2008): 159–185. Chien-peng Chung, “Southeast Asia-
China Relations: Dialectics of “Hedging” and “Counter-Hedging,” Southeast Asian Affairs, 2004: 35–53. 
Denny Roy, “Southeast Asia and China: Balancing or Bandwagoning,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 27, 
no. 2 (2005): 305–322. 
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security of the region’s, so that they would be more interested in helping to maintain 
regional stability,”19 but at its root, her explanation has many of the same characteristics 
that others describe as hedging.  
While the cases presented in support of the hedging hypothesis cannot be entirely 
discounted, they need to be reassessed for the following reasons. First, they deal with the 
entire modern history of these countries foreign relations, and while that provides 
richness of detail, it does not focus sufficiently on the most recent history, which has 
been the setting for one of the most dynamic changes in the regional power structure in 
modern Asia, as will be discussed in Chapter III. Those looking for evidence of a shift in 
foreign policy by these states should examine that specific period carefully rather than 
survey the entire record. Second, the concept of hedging is the result of scholarly efforts 
to describe those behaviors in Southeast Asia that do not fit into the well-defined existing 
areas of theory. This makes it analytically unsatisfying in that it is not falsifiable, and it 
can easily be applied to any effort at broad international engagement.  
Finally, from a policy standpoint, it is not particularly useful either for the states 
that are supposedly employing it or the states that must engage with them. For Singapore 
and Vietnam, hedging is not a viable long-term strategy given the quickening change in 
the international structure. No number of bilateral agreements with small powers can 
constrain the larger powers if those agreements run counter to their interests. In one of 
Goh’s earlier works, she claims that Singapore is encouraging further U.S. security 
engagements in the hopes that it will manifest into greater economic and political 
discussions to “ensure that China’s growing economic power does not completely 
dominate Southeast Asia,”20 which sounds a great deal like a traditional balancing 
strategy. My approach, laid out below, will attempt to utilize the international relations 
theories discussed above to explain the behavior of Southeast Asia without the ambiguity 
of the hedging concept. 
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5. Hypothesis 
This hypothesis seeks to offer an alternative framework to explain the policies of 
Vietnam and Singapore. It draws primarily on Schweller and Walt’s description of 
balancing behaviors in response to threat but characterizes those decisions, not as 
immediate changes, but as a bargaining process between the states, as described by 
Snyder. It hypothesizes that the speed of this negotiating process is influenced by the 
clarity of the threat, and the nature of a state’s existing relationships. 
As a broad theory, when threats are ambiguous, a state will utilize that flexibility 
to negotiate relatively equal relationships among all potential alignment partners to create 
an arrangement that offers the greatest potential for gains while avoiding settling on one 
particular arrangement to prevent that state from becoming entrapped. When a source of 
threat can be clearly identified, a state must examine whether the benefits gained from its 
existing alignment out-weigh the benefits from an alternative alignment. If the state’s 
national interest and security will be better provided for by an alternative alignment the 
state will take action to secure that arrangement. This action will be constrained by the 
difficulty in divorcing itself from the existing institutions and the need to establish similar 
arrangements with the new alignment partner without provoking the other. This process 
will likely take the form of the smaller steps described by Snyder and proceed in 
sequence from building the less provocative diplomatic and economic relationships and 
then expanding to security engagement. The timeline for this process can vary. In the 
event of actual hostilities the process would be rapid as the concern over provocation 
would be moot. In a peacetime condition, this process can potentially occur over a period 
of years, and for a state that finds its actions severely constrained by coercive actions 
from the threatening power, the transition could take decades.  
C. RESEARCH METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis will be broken down into two primary sections. The first part, Chapter 
II, will examine the remarkable changes in alignment witnessed in Finland since its 
independence in 1917 when Finland faced similar choices to those the states of Southeast 
Asia faced today. Conflicted initially between Germany and the Soviet Union, and later 
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between the Soviet Union and the West, an examination of Finland’s actions will serve to 
enhance both the understanding of how states shift their alignment but also to test the 
hypothesis presented above. In the second part, Chapter III will set the stage for the two 
case studies to follow by discussing how the balance of power has begun to shift in Asia. 
Charting China’s growing strength and assertiveness and the United States’ concentration 
in other areas of the world during the first decade of the twenty-first century will provide 
a better context for the foreign policy decisions made in Singapore and Vietnam. 
Chapters IV and V will examine Vietnam and Singapore respectively. Both case studies 
will use existing academic works and diplomatic histories to describe the foreign policy 
motivations of each state during the second half of the twentieth century. Following these 
discussions in each case, study will be a focused look at if, and how, those patterns have 
changed in the last decade.  
This time frame was chosen for two reasons. First, while China’s economic and 
military power has been growing for more than three decades, the last decade has shown 
the greatest growth in their economy and a remarkable modernization of their military, 
both of which are likely to spark at least a reexamination of existing relationships 
amongst states in the region. Second, it provides the ability to study the most recent 
developments and ignore the longer history that could cloud determination of the state’s 
current diplomatic intentions. The case studies will rely primarily on press reporting on 
diplomatic and military developments, trade and investment statistics and official 
government statements from all four governments to characterize their changing 
relationships. The focus on these secondary sources is a limitation imposed by 
spotlighting the last decade, a period in which there are few declassified diplomatic 
documents or published biographies by key decision makers to draw direct evidence 
from.  
In an attempt to minimize ambiguities, metrics that characterize a state’s level of 
commitment to another state in the areas of diplomatic, economic and military 
cooperation will be utilized to measure the general trend in relations between each dyad. 
In order of increasing commitment, based on the potential for provocation of other states, 
these factors are: ministerial engagement, trade agreements, summits or meetings of key 
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leaders, joint economic projects, memorandums of understanding or agreement 
(especially in military affairs), shared military exercises, formal alliances, joint 
statements against a threat state and joint military exercises that specifically address a 
threat state. By examining each states progression along this scale, general trends 
concerning alignment can be identified. These progressions can then be compared to 
predictions generated by application of the hypothesis and presented along with policy 
prescriptions in the conclusion in Chapter VI. 
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II. REALIGNMENT IN FINLAND 
Before moving on to the modern questions of alignment in Southeast Asia, an 
examination of a recent historical case can present useful context. At first glance, it may 
be difficult to compare Finland’s position in the international community during the last 
century with the questions facing Southeast Asia in the twenty-first century. To be sure, 
the nature of the relationship between the United States and China is very different from 
the one that existed between Germany and the Soviet Union in the early part of the 
century and between the West and the Soviet Union during the last half of the twentieth 
century. There is far less animosity or chance for hostilities in the present day, but the 
slowly growing differences between the United States and China do begin to present the 
states of Southeast Asia with a potential decision concerning alignment. As with Finland, 
the states of Southeast Asia find themselves in a vulnerable geographic position. 
Sandwiched between the Soviet Union and Western Europe, Finland was constrained in 
its choices for alignment. Similarly, Vietnam, and to a lesser extent, Singapore find 
themselves inside China’s growing sphere of influence while still faced with a sizable 
U.S. presence in the region, the combination of which restricts their ability to make clear 
alignment choices. This chapter will chronicle Finland’s efforts to reorient their 
alignment and compare the causes and constraints to those outlined in the hypothesis.  
Finland’s pre-World War II policies demonstrate how a poorly defined threat 
environment can prevent a state from taking prompt action to balance against the most 
immediate threat. Unable to define whether the Soviet Union or Germany presented the 
greatest danger, Finland chose to pursue a policy of engagement with both states. In the 
type of bargaining behavior described by Snyder, Finland looked to determine which 
arrangement was most beneficial knowing that soon it would likely be forced to make a 
choice. The Soviet invasion removed any lingering doubt and throughout the remainder 
of the war, as threats rapidly emerged from both sides, Finland clearly chose a policy of 
balancing against the most immediate threat.  
As the war drew to an end, Finland found itself in a situation in which it had few 
alignment options and was increasingly threatened by the Soviet Union. Under these 
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conditions, its only option was to bandwagon with the west, not out of a desire for profits 
but as a way of protecting its security, as described by Walt. But Finland remained a 
status-quo power, and so immediately began to look for ways to balance against the 
threat from Moscow. Finland’s early Cold War focus of engagement with the West was 
through economic and diplomatic channels. Its policy was designed to pacify the Soviet 
Union while still attempting to integrate itself with the Western world. It did this by 
pursuing the types of relationships with the West that were least threatening to the 
Moscow. As external conditions changed with the lessening of Soviet pressure, Finland 
managed a gradual and then accelerated realignment toward the West.  
A. FINLAND’S FOREIGN RELATIONS 1917–1948 
Before examining Finland’s Cold War policies, it is important to understand the 
events leading up to and during World War II because they help chart Finland’s prior 
experience in navigating the waters between two powers vastly more powerful that itself. 
In 1917, Finland declared its independence from the Soviet Union and was immediately 
embroiled in a civil war between the Whites, supported by Germany and the Reds, 
supported by the Soviet Union. The Whites prevailed by the end of 1918, and Finland 
maintained its close relationship Germany, initially offering the Finnish Crown to a 
German nobleman (though later withdrawing the offer after the German defeat in World 
War I) and using German assistance to establish its armed forces. Finland maintained this 
close alignment with Germany throughout most of the interwar period.  
As the threat of a potential clash between Germany and Soviet Union grew in the 
years before World War II, Finland began to rethink such a close association with 
Germany. Memory of the Soviets’ role in the civil war had begun to fade and the Nazi 
intentions toward Finland grew increasingly uncertain, leading Finland to question which 
state posed the larger threat. This resulted in a growing inability to determine which 
nation represented the greater threat and constrained Finland’s ability to balance. Instead, 
Finland attempted to bargain with both nations to achieve the best possible diplomatic 
arrangements. Still maintaining its relationship with Germany, Finland simultaneously 
began to pursue an expanded diplomatic relationship with the Soviet Union. In 1932, 
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Finland signed a nonaggression treaty with the Soviet Union, and in 1935 the parliament 
approved a declaration of “Finland’s adherence to Scandinavian neutrality.” In 1937, the 
new Finnish Foreign minister made Moscow his first visit, during which the Soviets 
made an offer to provide military assistance to counter a potential German invasion. The 
offer included the provision that the Soviet Union be allowed to occupy the Finnish 
islands south of the mainland. Finnish leaders were unwilling to establish such a close 
security relationship with the Soviet Union due both to concerns over Soviet troops on 
Finnish soil and fears of provoking Germany.21  During the same period, Finland 
continued to maintain its existing relationship with Germany, allowing a German 
submarine flotilla and naval squadron to conduct port calls in Finland in 1937 and 1938 
respectively and welcoming the German Army Chief of Staff in 1939.22   
Germany and the Soviets began dividing up Eastern Europe in 1939, and the 
growing unease with Finland’s relationship with Germany led the Soviets invite a Finnish 
delegation to Moscow. During the visit, they demanded that Finland cede to the Soviets 
the area along Finland’s southeast border, the islands in the Gulf of Finland and land near 
the opening to the Gulf of Finland for a Soviet Naval base. The Soviets’ stated intention 
was to protect Leningrad from an invasion through Finland or the Gulf of Finland, but the 
Finnish government was concerned that the Soviets might capitalize on a naval base so 
close to Helsinki, and Finland refused to accept the agreement. Within two weeks, the 
nonaggression treaty between the two states was cancelled, and the Soviets invaded 
Finland.23 
The Soviet invasion erased any ambiguity over which state posed the most 
pressing threat to Finnish sovereignty and marked the temporary end of Finland’s 
attempts to engage with the Soviet Union. Finnish forces were greatly out-numbered but 
managed to stymie the Soviet invasion, and generate a stalemate after less than a month 
of fighting. Finland’s government looked to the international community for assistance 
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but found little. Germany was constrained by its nonaggression pact with the Soviets, and 
France and Britain’s offer of assistance was insufficient to defeat the Soviets and could 
have brought the war with Germany to the Scandinavian countries. This presents 
interesting evidence that the credibility of a balancing partner is equally as important as 
the availability of it. Finland understood that France and Britain’s offer was inadequate 
and so chose not to attempt to balance against the Soviet Union. With no real options for 
continuing its defense and no viable alignment partners, Finland signed a peace treaty 
with Moscow in March 1940, giving up huge concessions to the Soviet Union.24 
In August of that year, Germany offered to sell arms to Finland in exchange for 
allowing the Germany army passage through to Norway. The Finnish government saw 
this as a way to counter Soviet pressure and agreed, but when the German’s launched 
their attack on the Soviet Union in 1941 through Finland, the Finnish government’s 
attempts to maintain its neutral position failed. Finland found itself once again at war 
with the Soviets, this time alongside the Germans, but Finland attempted to put a fine 
point on its position, declaring that that were fighting a “separate war,” and were “not 
part of the German-Soviet struggle.”25 Finland’s army succeeded in taking back the land 
that it had lost to the Soviets and establishing a defensive zone on their eastern border but 
refused requests by Germany to continue their offensive toward Leningrad.26   In this 
instance, Finland was unwilling to align closer to Germany, potentially challenging the 
validity of the balance of threat argument. But, Finland policies still reflected an 
uncertainty about the threat and the eventual outcome of the war. 
Despite Finnish efforts to distance themselves from the German War effort, 
German control of food supplies and other essentials provided the Germans with 
significant leverage. Germany forced Finland to break diplomatic relations with Britain, 
which in turn declared war on Finland. Finland was increasingly isolated, but signs of 
German weakness were beginning to show by 1943 with the defeat at Stalingrad, and 
Finland began exploring ways to settle a separate peace with the Soviets. Initial talks with 
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the Soviets collapsed though, and the Red Army began a major offensive against Finland, 
forcing the Finnish army to withdraw. The Soviets demanded unconditional surrender. 
Germany again offered to provide weapons and assistance in exchange for a promise that 
Finland would not seek out a separate peace. The Finnish president agreed to the 
provisions in a personal letter to Hitler, an empty promise since it had not been agreed to 
by the Parliament. With German assistance, Finland succeeded in stopping the Soviet 
advance, and the Soviets shifted their focus toward Berlin creating a stalemate in Finland 
until they signed a separate peace with the Soviet Union in 1944 and turned on the 
remaining German forces in Finland.27 
Finland’s interwar and World War II foreign policies were defined by its inability 
to identify the primary threat and take appropriate action. In the absence of a clearly 
defined balancing option, Finland chose to pursue broader engagement to avoid either 
provoking a response from Germany or the Soviet Union or settling on specific alignment 
and risking entrapment as Snyder predicts. In the interwar years, this lack of an 
immediate threat allowed, and in fact encouraged, Finland to pursue a relationship with 
both Germany and the Soviet Union. The strength of its existing relationship with 
Germany delayed Finland’s response to the growing threat posed by Hitler, encouraging 
naval and senior officer visits even as German troops marched into Czechoslovakia, 
while remaining indecisive about establishing a security relationship with the Soviet 
Union. The coherency of Finland’s security policy broke down completely as it shifted to 
survival mode, fending off each new threat as it emerged, in what can be described as an 
attempt to balance against the most dominate threat as one receded and the other grew 
more pressing. 
The end of the Second World War placed Finland in a precarious international 
position. As was discussed in Chapter I, according to Walt, states are inclined to 
bandwagon when they are weak and vulnerable to aggression from a threatening state and 
they have few alliance partners available. In this situation Finland was ultimately forced 
to bandwagon with the Soviet Union. Finland had fought against both sides of the 
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conflict and earned the mistrust of Russians, Germans, French, British and the Americans 
alike, the country was overflowing with refugees from former Finnish territory that was 
now occupied by the Soviet Union, and the economy was crippled. Finland was an 
outcast at a time when ideological lines were being drawn between the east and west, and 
the United States had indicated which side of that line it believed Finland was on, 
warning Finland that it would not provide assistance in the event of a conflict with the 
Soviet Union. In this context, held at arm’s length by the west, with the Red Army at its 
border, and the Soviet Sphere of influence expanding through Eastern Europe, Finland 
chose to pursue a policy that would pacify the Soviet Union and build its trust.  
To that end, Finland immediately began paying the large war indemnity to the 
Soviet Union, turned down Marshall Plan aid from the United States and convicted senior 
Finnish politicians for their role in the war with the Soviet Union, all intended as trust 
building measures.28  The biggest trust building measure between the two countries came 
with the agreement on a mutual defense pact entitled the 1948 Treaty of Friendship, 
Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA). The treaty was initiated by the Soviet 
Union but unlike the other defense pacts the Soviets had signed with Bulgaria, Hungary 
and Romania, the pact that was eventually signed with Finland allowed Finland greater 
latitude. It called for consultations and mutual agreement in decisions to go to war, and 
called for Soviet assistance only if requested by Finland.29  In exchange for this security 
guarantee, Finland was allowed to maintain its democratic system and a relative 
autonomy in its foreign policy but the treaty placed it clearly within the Soviet sphere of 
influence. These early Cold War actions by Finland demonstrate reluctance to 
bandwagon with the Soviet Union. The limitations Finland placed on the wording of the 
FCMA and the insistence on maintaining its democratic systems demonstrates this. While 
taking action to ease Soviet strategic concerns, it took great pains to minimize the 
infringement on its political system and its sovereignty. This reveals the limitations of 
bandwagoning alignment when it is for security reasons rather than profit and strengthens 
the idea that status-quo states are more likely to balance. Finland’s foreign policies over 
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the next several decades demonstrate that, rather than bandwagoning, the arrangement 
could be viewed as a severely constrained form of balancing. The following section 
examines how Finland began to alter this arrangement in favor of balancing with the 
West.  
B. FINLAND’S POLITICAL REALIGNMENT  
This was the state of affairs that Finland had to contend with throughout the Cold 
War. It was allowed to pursue its own foreign policy initiatives but those initiatives were 
carefully weighed against the reaction that they might draw from the Soviet Union. This 
was especially in evidence in the first years of the treaty when conditions were 
particularly tenuous. In 1949, Finland withdrew from discussions on a Scandinavian 
defense alliance, and in 1952 Finland opted out of the proposed Nordic Council. Both 
decisions were due to pressure from the Soviets. But, by the late 1950s, Finnish policies 
had earned the trust of the Soviet Union and Moscow began to relax their restrictions on 
Finnish diplomacy. 
1. Diplomatic Relations – The Cold War 
Diplomatic relations, as opposed to economic or security relations, was the area of 
Finnish foreign policy that Finland was the most free to pursue. As Moscow’s paranoia 
began to lessen in 1955, the Finns used the expanded diplomatic space to forge new 
relationships and renew old ones. In 1955, Finland joined the Nordic Council, which 
coordinated economic and social cooperation (but specifically excluded security 
cooperation) between the Nordic countries. Later that year, they joined the United 
Nations. Finland was an active member in both of these organizations and used them to 
work toward developing regional stability. Finland felt that by acting as a gateway 
between Europe and the Soviet Union it could help to foster peace and minimize the 
leverage that the Soviet Union had over it through the FCMA.  
One of the most prominent examples of Finland’s use of multi-lateral diplomacy 
occurred in 1975 when Finland hosted the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (CSCE) bringing together leaders of 35 countries, placing Finland at the center of 
the international stage. The Helsinki Accords signed at the end of the conference were 
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viewed at the time as a victory for the Soviets since it granted formal acknowledgement 
by the West of the existing European security situation including the Soviet’s sphere of 
influence in Eastern Europe. For Finland though, it also meant that the Soviets had 
acknowledged that Finland was outside of that sphere, something that they had been 
reluctant to do in bilateral negotiations. 30   
These early diplomatic efforts were the beginning of a process of realignment for 
Finland. They allowed Finland to integrate itself into the Western sphere without drawing 
suspicion from Moscow. It is clear from examining these early attempts at diplomatic 
engagement that Finland preferred to work through multi-lateral diplomacy as opposed to 
bi-lateral arrangements. These arrangements were not only less provocative than bilateral 
relationships would be, which excluded the Soviet Union, they also provided Finland 
with the ability to cast the widest diplomatic net. The policy of using broad engagement 
and multi-lateral diplomacy to enhance stability by acting as a liaison while minimizing 
negative reactions from the Soviet Union characterized Finland’s diplomatic policy 
throughout the rest of the Cold War.  
2. Economic Relations – The Cold War 
Finland’s economic relationship with the Soviet Union after World War II 
primarily consisted of exports to the Soviet Union to pay the war reparations. By 1952, 
those reparations were repaid and economic cooperation began under a clearing trade 
system regulated by five-year bilateral trade agreements that were continuously renewed 
until 1990. Trade with the Soviet Union accounted for about 16% of Finland’s trade from 
1945–1990. Trade was dominated by ship construction and forest products from Finland 
in exchange for petroleum products from the Soviet Union. The trade agreements 
provided the Finns with a consistent source of trade, and the oil crises of the 1970s and 
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their losses in other markets. But, beyond the trade outlined in the bilateral agreements 
there was little other economic interaction between the two states, and Finland worried 
about excessive reliance on the Soviet market.31 
Finland’s strict reparations payment schedule forced Finland to develop new 
industries beyond its traditional forestry products. These new industries, which included 
shipbuilding and metalworking, soon needed new markets outside of the Soviet Union to 
sustain them. This need for broader markets and the desire by Finland to counterbalance 
its economic reliance on the Soviet Union led Finland to seek expanded economic 
cooperation with the West. To accomplish this, Soviet concerns that strengthening 
economic relations with the West could carry implied security guarantees had to be 
addressed.  
Finland’s initial efforts toward economic integration focused on international 
institutions that were again less threatening to the Soviet Union. In the late 1940s, 
Finland joined the IMF, the World Bank and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT). By the late 1950s, Finland began a more focused effort to engage with the West 
as the growing economic integration in Western Europe threatened to exclude Finland 
from important markets. Finland’s efforts to develop their economic relationship with the 
West confronted several major challenges during this period. In 1957, unable to join the 
Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) due to Soviet pressure, 
Finland established the Helsinki Club, which included the OEEC as a member, providing 
Finland access to the same trade benefits without the political baggage. In 1959, seven 
Western European States created the European Free Trade Area (EFTA). This left 
Finland at a significant disadvantage in those markets and threatened its economic 
survival. Initially, the Soviets would not allow Finland to join the EFTA, but eventually 
they consented to a parallel organization, FINEFTA, that gave Finland associate 
membership in EFTA and again provided the same access to European markets. A similar 
compromise was made in 1974 to allow Finland to obtain a trade agreement with the 
European Economic Community when that organization expanded to include the 
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EFTA.32  In all three cases, in exchange for Moscow’s consent, Finland agreed to a 
comparable trade arrangement with the Soviet Union. These agreements with the West 
and the trade that they created enhanced Finland’s economic security and its relationship 
with the West at the cost of its economic interaction with the Soviet Union, which had 
become fairly static due to the highly regulated trade clearing system. This economic 
integration with the West marked the first clear steps in Finland toward a change in 
alignment by providing Finland with concrete and preferable alternatives to the Soviet 
clearing trade system.  
3. Security Relations – The Cold War 
Finland’s security relations were much more difficult to manage. The Paris Peace 
Treaty had limited the size of the Finnish military force and prevented it from developing 
or acquiring weapons of an offensive nature. This left Finland in a tenuous security 
position. It also had few options for outside security guarantees. Concerns in the Soviet 
Union kept Finland from approaching the West, and it did not want to expand its existing 
security guarantee with the Soviet Union beyond the FCMA for fear of becoming 
unnecessarily entangled.  
With so few external options available, Finland turned to rebuilding and 
restructuring its defense forces. Under the Paris Peace Treaty, the size of the Army was 
limited to 34,000 men, the Navy was limited to 4,500 men and the Air Force to 3,000 
men. The treaty also put restrictions on the equipment that the military could use by 
prohibiting offensive weapons, including submarines, missiles and mines, and limiting 
naval shipping to less than 10,000 tons and the number of combat aircraft to 60. To 
compensate for this, Finland developed a doctrine that maximized the use of Finland’s 
natural terrain advantages and made significant use of conscripts. Within the bounds of 
the treaty, Finland also began to procure more modern weapon systems from a wide 
variety of sources during the 1950s and 1960s. Aircraft were procured from England, 
France, Sweden, Switzerland and the Soviet Union. Tanks and ships were bought from 
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England and the Soviet Union as well as interceptor and anti-tank missiles once the 
provision against missiles was lifted in 1962.33  Finland was able to justify these 
acquisitions to the Soviet Union by claiming that it would enable them to uphold their 
end of the FCMA, but still the lack of Soviet reaction to the procurement of weapons 
from the West is striking.  
The Soviets made two approaches beyond the FCMA toward a stronger security 
relationship with Finland. In 1954, the Soviets invited Finland to attend a conference in 
Moscow on European security. When it became clear that Western European countries 
would not be attending, Finland chose not to send a delegation to the conference, which 
later became the first step in the creation of the Warsaw Pact.34  The Soviets made 
another other offer to expand its security relationship with Finland in 1978, when the 
Soviet defense minister broached the subject during an official visit to Finland. The 
Finnish President refused to discuss the issue, and it was dropped again, demonstrating 
the weakness of a coerced bandwagoning relationship.35   
Unable to pursue direct security relationships, Finland’s primary security 
interaction with the West was through its active participation in UN peacekeeping 
operations. Despite its relatively small military force, Finland was a routine participant in 
these efforts. It began providing troops to UN missions in 1956, sending 250 troops to 
Egypt and by 1974 peacekeepers and observers had been sent to Lebanon, Jammu 
Kashmir, Cyprus and Syria. Through these efforts, it developed greater military ties with 
the West and achieved at least a basic level of interoperability with foreign military 
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England and the United States. By 1985, over 40 Finnish officers had attended these 
colleges in the West, while only three attended the Frunze Military Academy in 
Moscow.37 
4. The End of the Cold War 
By the mid-1980s economic stagnation in the Soviet Union and the policies of 
Mikhail Gorbachev to counteract it, including both domestic and foreign policy reforms, 
lessened both the real strength of the country and its perception as a threat to Finland. 
This generated a series of actions in Finland that would build upon its earlier policies to 
completely reorient their alignment in favor of Europe and the West. As Max Jakobson, a 
former Finnish Government official has stated, “As Soviet power waned, Finland began 
to edge toward full participation in Western Institutions, but gingerly, like a hunter who 
has shot a bear but is not quite sure the beast is dead.”38  This is not to say that the 
decline of the Soviet Union no longer represented a threat to Finland. But, Gorbachev’s 
policies began to lessen the pressure placed on Finland to conform and Finland was 
finally able to realize its balancing ambitions. 
In the late 1980s, falling oil prices led to a decline in trade with the Soviet Union 
and Finland looked to the West to offset the losses in the East. This time, Finland did not 
seek approval from the Soviet Union, and in 1986, Finland became a full member of the 
EFTA. This began the final shift in trade from the East to the West, and by 1990 export 
trade to Russia had dropped from 20% of total exports in 1986 to less than 3%. As the 
Russian economy began to recover, export trade from Finland increased, amounting to 
almost 9% of Finland’s total exports by 2004. These numbers are still small compared to 
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60% of Finland’s total imports and exports. Regarding FDI, in 2003, the European share 
of the accumulated investment in Finland was 90% and Finland invested 75% of its total 
foreign investment in the EU.39 
This economic shift was accompanied by a newly found diplomatic space that 
also allowed Finland to take actions to expand its political engagement with Europe and 
the West into a more formalized association. In 1989, it joined the Council of Europe, 
and in 1991 it renounced the FCMA and began negotiations for a new treaty with the 
Soviet Union, which remained unsigned due to the latter’s collapse. In 1992, Finland 
applied for membership in the European Union, which it joined in 1995, when it was also 
granted observer status in the Western European Union (WEU).40  Finland has continued 
to shy away from full membership in the WEU or NATO over concerns that it could 
create anxiety in Moscow, but it did work to modify its forces to be more compatible 
with NATO. Finland participated in NATO led operations in the former Yugoslavia in 
1996–2003, and through the Partnership for Peace Program, it has continued to conduct 
similar operations. 41   
While domestic debates continue about future NATO membership, Finland has 
increased its security cooperation with its European neighbors. In 1999, during the first 
Finnish Presidency of the EU, Finland proposed that the EU develop the ability to rapidly 
deploy 50,000–60,000 troops for a period of up to one year to conduct peacekeeping and 
HADR operations. Finland contributes forces to the EU’s battlegroup standby forces and 





                                                 
39 Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, “Finland’s Trade Policy Programme,” Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs of Finland, September 8, 2005, 
http://formin.finland.fi/public/download.aspx?ID=15119&GUID={EDBBCC79–8899–4B15–9A95-
FA7830E7EF46} (accessed November 19, 2011). 
40 Stephen J. Blank, Finnish Security and European Security Policy, Strategic Studies Institute 
(Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 1996), 3. 
41 Svarre Myrli, “Contributions of Non-NATO Members to NATO Operations,” NATO Parliamentary 
Assembly, 2008, http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=1475 (accessed October 20, 2011). 
 28 
2011. Regionally, Finland has joined with the other Nordic countries to form the Nordic 
Defense Cooperation (NORDEFCO) and has conducted air exercises with Norway and 
Sweden.42  
C. CONCLUSION 
Finnish foreign policy during the second half of the twentieth century is a story of 
political realignment. In Finland’s early independence, it clung to Germany to balance 
against the Soviet Union but as German intentions became less clear in the lead up to 
World War II, Finland began attempts to negotiate alternative alignment options. The 
difficulty that Finland had was due to the uncertainty over which country, Germany or 
the Soviet Union posed the greater threat while simultaneously finding that there were no 
other alignment options available. This created a situation where Finland was forced to 
choose between two evils and was unable to do so. Finland’s approach in pursuing 
parallel relations with both countries only served to create unease and resulted in the 
invasion of Finland. This resolved the uncertainty in Finland and the result was a rapid 
and complete termination of its relationship with the Soviet Union, but there were again 
no external alternatives to balance against the Soviet threat and Finland was forced to rely 
solely on itself until the German’s terminated the Non-Aggression Pact.  
Finland never fully gravitated toward Germany, however. It utilized the much-
needed German assistance to expel the Soviet Union but refused to carry out German 
requests to continue the offensive into Soviet territory. This, once again, may have been 
due to the uncertainty over Germany’s ultimate intentions, the unease brought about by 
foreign boots on Finnish soil or a desire to avoid winding up on the losing side during a 
time when the outcome was uncertain. Whatever the reason, Finland’s uneasy 
cooperation with Germany demonstrates the limitations of an alignment that is imposed 
out of necessity rather than entered into willingly, as would be demonstrated again during 
the Cold War.  
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The Finns, never fully comfortable with their association with the Soviet Union 
after World War II, were forced, for practical reasons, to lean in that direction. Once the 
Soviet Union had been convinced of their loyalty, they used diplomatic engagement, 
specifically through multi-lateral organizations to maintain relations with the West and 
look for opportunities to cooperate. Security cooperation was out of the question at the 
time so those opportunities came in the form of greater economic integration via the EEC 
and the EFTA. This served to increase Finland’s ties with Europe, but Finland would 
need to wait another decade before the reduction in Soviet power would allow them to 
expand the relationship and to truly balance against Russia. 
The end of the Cold War allowed Finland to more thoroughly integrate itself with 
Europe and the West, but the foundation for this was laid over a period of decades of 
bargaining to expand cooperation in areas that would draw less reaction from the Soviet 
Union. As was demonstrated above, this was primarily accomplished by pursuing multi-
lateral economic cooperation with Europe while offering similar terms to the Soviet 
Union to make the arrangement more palatable. This slow process also demonstrates the 
importance of establishing acceptable and stable alternative arrangements before going 
about the process of severing the old ones. Finland’s aversion to cooperation with the 
Soviet Union and the coercive nature of the relationship prevented the types of strong 
institutions with the Soviet Union that Finland was forming in Europe. This meant that 
once the tools of coercion, military and economic power, had begun to dissipate there 
was no other reason to exercise restraint in aligning itself more completely with Europe, 
and the result was the rapid shift witnessed in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
Some important conclusions about how states align can be identified by this 
analysis. First, it validates the assertion that states’ attempts to balance power are not a 
simple matter. For Finland, domestic constraints were not particularly significant but the 
need to take Soviet reactions into account in all of their political moves significantly 
constrained their actions. Second, it demonstrates the weakness of theories predicting 
bandwagoning alliances induced by threat and validates that balancing is the most likely 
response. Almost immediately, Finland began to take action to address this situation and 
correct it. Finally, Finland’s actions also show that, when seeking out alternative 
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alignments in the shadow of a threatening power the types of relationship that states can 
bargain over are based on the perceived level of provocation they will create. Economic 
and diplomatic relations can be pursued, within bounds, with little concern for drawing 
negative reactions, but small states have greater difficulty in reorienting their security 
alignment. For Finland, this was the most contentious issue and one that they have still 
failed to completely address as they continue to debate membership in NATO. The 
implication of this is that small states, which are exposed to eternal threats, must be very 
deliberate about their security policies. Changes in security relationships are likely to be 
minute, unless and until, the external environment changes significantly. This also means 
that small changes in security relationships may speak volumes about a state’s alignment 
intentions.  
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III. CHANGING REGIONAL POWER STRUCTURE 
The balance between Chinese and U.S. power in Southeast Asia has begun to 
shift. China has experienced phenomenal growth over the past two and a half decades. Its 
GDP has grown from just over $300 billion in 1985 to just under $5 trillion in 2009.43  At 
the same time, the Chinese military has significantly upgraded its capabilities, increasing 
its defense spending an average of 12.9% per year since 1989. China’s 2011 defense 
budget is reportedly set at $91.5 billion.44   This rapid increase in military and economic 
power has been accompanied recently by more assertive behavior and rhetoric regarding 
disputed territorial claims in the East and South China Seas, and U.S. military operations 
in the Pacific.  
During much of this growth in Chinese strength, the United States reduced its 
engagement in the region. Two wars in the Middle East and a faltering domestic 
economy led the United States to devote less attention to its relationships and obligations 
in the Pacific during much of the last decade and led to a policy in Southeast Asia that 
some described as “benign neglect.”45  Though the Obama administration has done much 
to address this since 2008, this shifting regional presence and strength between China and 
the United States creates a new situation for the states of Southeast Asia to contend with. 
This chapter is intended to lay the foundation for understanding the conditions that 
Singapore and Vietnam are facing before going on to describe how those countries are 
responding in the following two chapters. It specifically addresses the most recent 
decade, as that has been the period of the greatest growth in the Chinese economy as well 
as the most significant developments in China’s military modernization program. 
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A. GROWING CHINESE POWER 
Aggregate power is commonly measured in terms of military and economic 
power and population size. China has long held the population advantage over the United 
States, but the United States has overcome that advantage through vastly superior 
military and economic strength. Now that advantage is narrowing. Chinese power, when 
measured in economic or military terms, is still significantly less than the United States 
but in relative terms, China has made considerable progress in both areas over the last 
decade. China’s economy was roughly one-tenth of the size of the United States’ in 2000, 
but is now approximately one-third as measured by GDP in current U.S. dollars and is 
growing increasingly important to the states in Southeast Asia.46 
1. Military Modernization 
Military spending provides an indicator of overall military strength and Chinese 
military spending is increasing. While the percent of GDP that China spends on the 
military has not changed significantly over the last ten years, averaging around two 
percent, the overall economic growth has allowed the military to expand and 
modernize.47  China’s defense budget has grown from $26.9 billion in 2000, to the 
reported $91.5 billion budget for 2011.48  That number is still dwarfed by the $702 
billion the United States spent on defense in 2010.49  But, dispute exists about the 
accuracy of Chinese defense spending numbers. Beijing’s publicly reported defense 
budget does not include items like external procurement, foreign military aid, R&D, 
retirement costs and pensions, and strategic weapons development, leading some western 
experts to believe that actual spending may be two to twelve times the reported figure.50  
The Office of the Secretary of Defense estimated that China’s actual defense spending in 
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2010 was $160 billion, roughly twice the figure reported by the Chinese government.51  
Even if the published numbers are accurate, in relative terms, China is gaining.52  
According to those numbers, in 2000 China spent roughly 7% of the United States’ 
defense budget but in 2010 that number had nearly doubled to over 13%.53    
 
Figure 1.   Defense Spending of China and the U.S. as a Percentage of the Total 
The PLA’s modernization efforts have been significant. Over the past sixty years, 
the PLA has been transformed from an organization that relied on “human wave” tactics 
under Mao’s “people’s war” to an increasingly sophisticated military capable of winning 
“local wars under conditions of informationization.”54  Their most recent modernization 
efforts began in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when international condemnation of the 
Tiananmen Square Massacre and the fall of the Soviet Union led China to reconsider its  
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role in the international arena, and the overwhelming success by the United States and 
coalition forces in the Gulf War, using advanced technology and precision strike 
weapons, forced the PRC to question the capabilities of the PLA.55 
The PRC’s security environment is largely defined by concerns over threats to its 
sovereignty. The most significant challenge to the PRC’s sovereignty is the ongoing 
dispute over the island of Taiwan. Though there have been few direct military clashes, 
and Taiwan itself presents only a minimal offensive threat to the PRC, uncertainty on 
both sides, and the significant potential for American involvement in the event of 
hostilities, poses the greatest threat to China’s security. For this reason, the PLA’s recent 
modernization efforts have been focused on preventing permanent separation of Taiwan 
by deterring U.S. involvement by developing weapons and doctrine intended to deny the 
United States the ability to respond to a crisis. This area-denial strategy threatens to 
further reduce the United States’ presence in the region. 
Any involvement by the United States in a cross strait conflict is likely to rely 
heavily on the Navy. Understanding this, the PLA has invested in weapons and systems 
intended to counter the U.S. Navy’s ability to operate in the area. The PLAN’s large 
submarine force, as well as its expanding inventory of naval mines and small missile 
boats, like the Houbei guided missile patrol craft, all provide effective measures to 
counter or at least delay a U.S. response to a crisis. The much discussed, though still in 
development DF-21D, will augment these efforts without the risk to personnel. These 
efforts can be cued by the PLA’s growing suite of space and land based sensors. Newly 
developed surface and sky wave radars can detect these targets at sea from a significant 
distance, and with the help of satellite data, can provide firing solutions to 2nd Artillery or 
PLAN personnel.56  
Preventing the United States from responding will require more than just sinking 
a few ships though. The PLA will have to deny the U.S. and Taiwan Air Forces the 
                                                 
55 Heaton, “The People’s Republic of China,” 387. 
56 Owen R. Cote Jr., “Assessing the Undersea Balance Between the U.S. and China,” MIT Security 
Studies Program, February 2011, 
http://web.mit.edu/ssp/publications/working_papers/Undersea%20Balance%20WP11–1.pdf (accessed 
October 28, 2011), 14–17. 
 35 
ability to operate in the region. The PLAAF has addressed this by acquiring fourth 
generation fighters and advanced surface to air missiles from Russia and working to 
develop its own indigenously produced fighter. The 2nd Artillery has developed short and 
medium range ballistic missiles to destroy airfields and support facilities in Taiwan, 
Japan, and the Philippines that U.S. forces could operate from.57 
Finally, China is developing capabilities designed to specifically attack a 
significant U.S. center of gravity, its reliance on technology. The PLA’s development and 
successful test of a direct-ascent anti-satellite weapon provides it with the ability to 
severely degrade U.S. communication, navigation and intelligence surveillance and 
reconnaissance ISR capabilities. Coupled with China’s electronic and cyber attack 
measures these capabilities threaten to hamper the command and control capability of the 
United States. 58   
These modernization efforts have two main implications for the case studies 
examined in the following two chapters. First, they threaten to deny the United States the 
capability to respond to a crisis in the region. For both Singapore and Vietnam, this at 
least raises the question of how capable the United States is of guaranteeing security in 
the event of a confrontation with China. In other words, how viable is the United States 
as a balancing power. Second, they present a potential direct threat to those states within 
the growing range of these capabilities, as will be discussed next. 
2. Translation to Offensive Capabilities 
Walt claims that the offensive nature of weapons is one factor that leads a state to 
perceive a threat from another state. And, while Chinese discussions of the PLA’s 
modernization efforts above have emphasized defensive measures, many of the PLAN, 
PLAAF and 2nd Artillery capabilities being developed for a Taiwan contingency would 
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be highly effective in conducting local offensive operations that directly threaten 
Vietnam and Singapore. The perception of these capabilities in each county is likely 
different given the geographic proximity of Vietnam and the relative distance of 
Singapore. In the case of Vietnam, the PLA could likely bring all of their new capabilities 
to bear in a relatively short period and sustain them for a prolonged period while 
operating out of Chinese bases. The PLA expeditionary forces, though not sufficient for 
an attack on Taiwan, have improved in size and capabilities and would likely be one of 
the first units employed in a local war with Vietnam. The more offensive oriented 
weapons of the PLAAF and PLAN could augment these forces. The PLAN’s newest 
Sovremenny, Luyang II and Luzhou DDGs can provide deployable air defense platforms 
to allow greater flexibility and response time. These forces give China the capability to 
mobilize a small deployable joint force sufficient to engage successfully in regional 
conflicts and pose a significant threat to Vietnam. 
Singapore is a different case. Noticeably missing from China’s modernization 
program is substantial military air or sealift capability. China would find it nearly 
impossible to deploy and sustain a land force sufficient to defeat Singapore’s advanced 
military without outside assistance, and Chinese air refueling capability is not sizable 
enough to allow China to conduct major air strikes at that range. Still, China does possess 
some weapons that could strike Singapore. China’s IRBM missile inventory represents a 
threat to Singapore, but there are a limited number of them, and they are mostly pointed 
at Taiwan. The growth of the South Sea Fleet, which includes China’s most modern 
nuclear submarines and a number of phased array capable destroyers, could also provide 
China with a naval option for operations against Singapore. These operations would be 
small however, and would only be capable of a short-term punitive action.  
B. GROWING CHINESE THREAT 
In addition to offensive capabilities, perception of another state’s intentions helps 
states to identify threats. All of the developments outlined above show how China’s 
military power in Asia is growing, but this thesis proposes that power on its own may not 
be sufficient to cause states to abandon or reinforce their existing alignments. The threat 
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of using that power is more important. The following section will demonstrate how 
Chinese power is being translated into a growing assertiveness that is increasingly 
interpreted by its neighbors as threatening. 
China’s rising relative power has been accompanied by an increasingly assertive 
foreign policy concerning resources and territorial claims, particularly in the last few 
years. This assertiveness is especially visible in its encounters with neighboring states at 
sea. In April 2010 and May 2011, helicopters from a Chinese vessel circled a JMSDF 
destroyer at a range of less than 100 yards.59   In the South China Sea, Chinese naval 
exercises near the Spratly Islands are growing larger and drawing protests from regional 
neighbors like Vietnam.60  Chinese patrol vessels have confronted, and in some cases, 
detained fishing and resource exploration vessels operating in disputed waters, generating 
official protests from the Philippines and Vietnam.61  The United States has also been a 
target of Chinese harassment, demonstrating China’s growing confidence. In 2009, five 
vessels, possibly associated with the China Marine Surveillance (CMS) service, 
maneuvered close to the USNS Impeccable and attempted to hook her towed array while 
operating approximately 75 nautical miles south of Hainan Island. Later that year, 
Chinese patrol craft also maneuvered aggressively close to the USNS Victorious while 
operating in the Yellow Sea.62 Some have claimed that these increasingly frequent 
confrontations, especially in the maritime arena, have been in response to the actions of 
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other states as opposed to unprovoked actions initiated by China.63  Either way, this 
growing tendency by China to resort to force over diplomacy has begun to generate 
unease among the states of Southeast Asia.  
C. U.S. REGIONAL PRESENCE  
In contrast to this ever growing expansion by China, the U.S. military and the 
government in general was distracted from its commitments in Asia for a large portion of 
the last decade. Lacking the geographic proximity of China, the United States presence in 
Asia is more difficult to sustain. Additionally, the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan 
reduced the numbers of troops and equipment available for regional and bilateral military 
exercises and lessened the ability of the United States to respond to a crisis in Asia. This 
was most clearly evidenced in the early part of the last decade by the 2004 decision to 
redeploy almost 9,000 of the 37,000 U.S. troops stationed in South Korea to support the 
war in Iraq. 64  But in the last several years, the United States has taken some measures to 
correct this through force restructuring and military modernization efforts of its own.  
While not specifically developed in response to China, the F-22A, and to a lesser 
degree the F-35, have provided the United States with fifth generation strike fighters that 
are capable of outperforming any of the aircraft in the PLAAF’s arsenal through their 
reduced radar cross sections, enhanced weapons systems, and superior maneuverability. 
Unfortunately, the numbers of these fighters remain small due to budget constraints and 
development delays.65  In undersea warfare, the United States remains dominant. Chinese 
submarines, especially its indigenously produced hulls, are greatly inferior to the U.S. 
SSN and SSGN platforms in both weaponry and stealth. The Chinese advantage in 
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submarine operations lies in the growing numbers of submarines and the proximity of 
their operations from their logistics and support facilities. The United States has made 
efforts to overcome these advantages by forward basing three Los Angeles Class fast 
attack submarines in Guam to limit response time and by basing all three of the Navy’s 
most capable submarines, the Seawolf Class, in Bremerton, WA.66   
To counter the growing air threat from the PLAAF, and the ballistic missile threat 
from both North Korea and China, the United States Navy has assigned the majority of its 
BMD-capable Aegis ships to the Pacific and forward based some of them in Yokosuka, 
Japan. The Navy also has plans to expand the inventory of BMD capable ships through 
2021.67  Complementing the acquisition of these ships is the work on development of the 
SM-3 block IIA. This variant of the standard missile will fly fast enough to intercept 
some ICBMs in addition to the IRBMs that earlier versions were designed to intercept.68   
The United States diplomatic presence in Asia also suffered during the early part 
of the 2000s due to the focus on the Middle East. Perhaps the most notable slight 
occurred in 2005 when Condoleezza Rice’s failed to appear at the ASEAN Regional 
Forum meeting in Vientiane, Laos. The Obama administration has taken significant steps 
over the last few years to address this beginning in 2009 with Secretary of State Clinton’s 
tour of Asia. During that trip, she attended ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Thailand, 
where she signed the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and announced, “The 
United States is back in Southeast Asia.”69   
Following this declaration, the United States became more involved in regional 
issues, participating in discussions with key leaders over water management in the Lower 
Mekong, and offering to mediate the dispute over sovereignty in the South China Sea. It 
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has improved its bilateral relationship with Indonesia through its establishment of the 
Comprehensive Partnership and renewal of mil-to-mil ties with Indonesian Special 
Forces.70  In the Philippines, the United States has assisted in the establishment of the 
Coast Watch South program to improve the Philippine’s ability to secure its southern 
waterways. The United States has agreed to sell a Hamilton-class cutter to the Philippines 
and has funded the construction of coastal watch radar stations in Southern Philippine 
Waters.71  
Most recently, the United States has expanded its efforts to further integrate itself 
into broader Asia-Pacific institutions. Already a member of ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF) and a participant in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meetings, the 
United States recently accepted the invitation to join the East Asia Summit. Secretary of 
Defense Robert Gates participated in the inaugural session of the ASEAN Defense 
Ministers Meeting Plus. Finally, the United States has also initiated negotiations on a 
proposed alternative economic association, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), with 
Singapore and Vietnam along with seven other nations. 
D. CONCLUSION 
China’s growing power and new-found offensive strength presents an increasing 
threat to its regional neighbors. The power structure in Asia is changing. China is 
growing increasingly powerful and potentially threatening at a time when economic 
difficulties and expanding international engagements limit the ability of the United States 
to sustain a robust presence in Southeast Asia. China’s military modernization efforts are 
accelerating and providing it with a growing capability to counter U.S. presence in the 
region and potentially to conduct local offensive operations against their neighbors. In 
addition, China’s growing tendency to resort to coercion over diplomacy may raise 
concerns about the potential for Beijing to settle future disputes with violence. The 
reactions to the assertiveness are particularly important and vary throughout Southeast 
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Asia. States that become more convinced that these new capabilities may be directed at 
them are more likely to balance against what they perceive as a threat. The specifics of 
how Singapore and Vietnam perception will be addressed in the following chapters 
Through its renewed diplomatic and military interaction with Asia, the United 
States has tried to reduce the concerns in Southeast Asia about U.S. intentions in the 
region. Still, that attention in the future is not necessarily assured. The global scope of 
U.S. foreign policy concerns could lead to future distractions away from Asia to places 
like the Middle East or Europe. This may create a level of uncertainty in Southeast Asia 
over the wisdom of relying on the United States as a balancing partner as the focus on 
Asia, largely driven by the Obama administration, could shift depending on the outcome 
of the next election. 
While a confrontation between the United States and China is still far from likely, 
Southeast Asian leaders, confronted by this shift in regional power and the potential 
threat posed by China, are being forced to reconsider their strategic calculations. The 
following chapters will discuss how two countries, Vietnam and Singapore, are reacting 








Having looked at the changing international environment that Southeast Asia is 
confronted with in the last chapter, this thesis now turns its attention to how that change 
is affecting the foreign relations of two specific states in Southeast Asia, beginning with 
Vietnam. This chapter concludes that, as Vietnam has begun to view China as a greater 
threat, it has accelerated its efforts to expand its relationship with the other powers in the 
region including the United States, Russia and India in a distributive effort to balance that 
threat. This distributive balancing is a product of the multi-polar regional environment 
that allows Vietnam to address the threat from China while avoiding becoming 
abandoned or entrapped by any single alignment partner as discussed by Snyder. This 
conclusion validates the hypothesis that as threats become more acute, states become 
increasingly inclined to balance against them, and that they engage in bargaining 
behavior in order to negotiate the most beneficial alternative arrangements before making 
alignment decisions. It also shows how the greater availability of alignment partners 
enables states to balance in different ways than have previously been considered. 
Additionally, the case finds that, even in small states, domestic politics can exert 
enormous influence on states behavior especially in the absence of a specific threat. The 
decline of ideology as a justification for the CPV continued leadership legitimacy has led 
Vietnam to increasingly rely on economic growth as the new source of legitimacy, 
encouraging Vietnam to seek broader international engagement. This supports David’s 
theory that smaller states must consider internal threats when developing a balancing 
strategy. The cumulative effect of these internal and international factors has been a 
growing, though cautious openness toward a broader range of international relations and 
a growing concern over becoming too closely tied to China. 
A. HISTORICAL VIETNAMESE FOREIGN POLICY 
Vietnamese foreign policy over the past four decades has been a mix of a need to 
balance against external threats to security and internal threats to legitimacy. Nineteen 
seventy-five was a watershed year for Vietnam. With the fall of Saigon in April, the 
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country brought to an end the period of colonization under the French and Japanese and 
occupation by U.S. forces. This century-long interference by the outside powers and 
centuries of conflict with China left an indelible impression in the minds of Vietnamese 
leaders, firmly placing state security and national sovereignty as a top priority.72  
In addition to Vietnam’s external threats, there were internal weaknesses. 
Unification, in name, had taken place in 1975, but the country still remained ideologically 
divided. South Vietnam had developed a capitalist system, which was incompatible with 
the strongly controlled communist economy in the north and there existed lingering 
mistrust of the citizens of the now unified south.73  These social cleavages caused the 
government of Vietnam to consider the threat of internal dissent equally as dangerous to 
the continued survival of the regime. 
Amid these perceptions of harsh internal and external threats, Vietnam attempted 
early on to pursue a relationship with both of its larger communist supporters, the Soviet 
Union and China. Early on however, disputes with China developed over Vietnam’s 
treatment of ethnic Chinese and the fighting along the Cambodian border. This growing 
animosity resulted in a Chinese decision in 1977 to cut its assistance to Vietnam. This led 
Vietnam to join the Soviet-led Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) in June 
1978, a step it had declined to take earlier due to concerns over provoking China. China 
responded by withdrawing the remainder of its aid to Vietnam. As Vietnam’s alignment 
options in the socialist world began to narrow, it looked outside this small group for 
alternative partners. In 1976, it applied for observer status in ASEAN, and more notably, 
Vietnam attempted to normalize its relationship with the United States in 1978, dropping 
all of its previously stated preconditions. Both attempts toward integration outside of 
socialist circles failed and in November 1978 Vietnam signed the Treaty of Friendship 
and Cooperation with the Soviet Union, becoming a formal ally.74  These early foreign 
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policy efforts demonstrate multiple efforts by Vietnam to negotiate balancing 
relationships with regional and extra-regional partners. As the options for partners began 
to dwindle, Vietnam found itself with only one viable option. So, while its need to form 
an alignment was driven by its external threat concerns, its final choice in this case was 
largely driven by its lack of options. This behavior supports the basic concept of balance 
of threat but also brings up the importance of available alignment partners. Walt has 
stated that states with fewer alignment partners will tend to bandwagon and it seems 
likely that, without the Soviet Union, Vietnam would have found itself in a position that 
required it to align more closely with China.  
After 1978, Vietnam’s foreign policy began to focus exclusively on insuring 
continued Soviet support to protect it from external threats and enable it to shore up its 
legitimacy. All other states were viewed as threats or potential threats and so there was 
little attempt to engage other countries. The Cambodian conflict, which began in 
December 1978, led to further international condemnation, and coordinated military 
action by Vietnam’s Southeast Asian neighbors, the United States and China, and further 
contributed to Vietnam’s isolation. During this period, Vietnam’s sense of vulnerability 
also had the effect of marginalizing the influence of domestic politics on foreign policy. 
The real and perceived external threats exceeded internal threats and foreign policy 
remained largely unchanged until events in the early 1980s necessitated a drastic change. 
B. THE 1980S AND BEYOND 
The United States’ normalization of relations with China in 1979 and the Soviets’ 
withdrawal of funding from Vietnam in the early 1980s significantly altered Vietnam’s 
security situation. Its two most powerful external threats were growing increasingly 
aligned and the balancing power Vietnam had chosen was growing less interested in 
Vietnam’s security.75  In addition, the Soviet-centric foreign policy that Vietnam had 
pursued in the 1970s and its international isolation led the country to a condition of 
declining social and economic stability. There were three key elements to this new 
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security situation. Vietnam had no alternative balancing partners available, internal 
threats brought about by economic decline were becoming increasingly pressing, and 
without Soviet funding, Vietnam could not undertake any significant internal balancing 
efforts. To address both the internal and external threats, Vietnam’s only option was to 
alter its existing policies to enable it to both expand its balancing options and create 
conditions that would allow economic growth.  
The policies of the late 1980s can largely be explained in this manner. To open up 
opportunities for negotiating new alignment options, Vietnam began to withdraw from 
Cambodia by the late 1980s. To counter the internal threats due to the failing Soviet 
economic model, the Vietnamese created the policy of doi moi or the politics of 
renovation in 1986.76  Doi moi was primarily a change in domestic policy intended to 
introduce economic and social reforms to build economic strength that would translate 
into military strength and shore up growing social unrest by improving the living 
conditions of the Vietnamese people. To that end, the government loosened its control on 
domestic economic activity, allowed commercial enterprises to grow, and reduced the use 
of cooperatives.77  However, it also began to open the economy to outside investment 
and influence. In this case, the balancing options for addressing both internal and external 
threats aligned to push Vietnam toward a broader international integration.  
In 1988, the Vietnamese government adopted a resolution that put diplomacy as 
the number one priority ahead of military strength and economic growth marking a 
notable change in emphasis from traditional self-help strategies to greater regional 
integration.78  This step was not taken in response to a change in external threats but as a 
way “to stabilize the domestic situation and set the base for economic development over 
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the next ten to fifteen years.”79  In fact, Vietnamese foreign policy during the late 1980s 
and early 1990s does not appear to be directed toward counterbalancing any particular 
threat or cultivating a specific relationship. Instead, unconstrained by any serious external 
threats due to its withdrawal from Cambodia and the rapprochement between China and 
the Soviet Union, Vietnam was able to pursue a wider variety of relationships in order to 
determine which were most beneficial without the need to make any firm commitments. 
In 1989, Vietnam had diplomatic relationships with twenty-three countries; by the mid-
1990s that number was 163, including all five permanent members of the UN Security 
Council. In 1995, Vietnam normalized relations with the United States, joined ASEAN 
and signed a cooperation agreement with the European Union.80   
1. Domestic Constraints 
While Vietnamese foreign policy was largely in-line with the predictions of 
balance of threat theory, Vietnam was not completely free from domestic constraints. The 
relative lack of external threats following the settlement of the Cambodian conflict in 
1991 allowed domestic politics to exert a larger influence than they had before. The 
Communist Party of Vietnam may be the only political party in Vietnam, but inside the 
party, there are debates about how foreign policy should be conducted. Since the 1980s, 
CPV members have been divided between two general strategies, a strategy of 
“integration,” promoted by the “modernizers,” and a strategy of “anti-imperialism,” 
promoted by the “conservatives.”81  During much of the period after the Cambodia 
conflict, the Vietnamese government operated at varying points along a spectrum 
between expanding its foreign relationships and bolstering regime authority through 
closer association with China depending on which group, the modernizers or the 
conservatives, held the greatest level of influence. When ideological encroachment from 
the west threatened to delegitimize the regime, a danger the conservatives referred to as 
peaceful evolution, the conservatives gained the upper hand and foreign policy would be 
                                                 
79 Carlyle A. Thayer, “Vietnamese Foreign Policy,” in Vietnamese Foreign Policy in Transition, ed. 
Carlyle A. Thayer and Ramses Amer, 1–24 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999). 
80 Thayer, “Vietnamese Foreign Policy,” 3–5. 
81 Vuving, “Strategy and Evolution of Vietnam’s China,” 821. 
 48 
based increasingly on ideology. When the country faltered economically causing internal 
instability, support would swing back toward the modernizers and foreign policy would 
focus again on external integration. Changing influence between modernizers and 
conservatives was slight and led to relative moderation in Vietnam’s foreign policy. 
Throughout these shifts, sufficient support for the opposing position remained to restrain 
Vietnamese foreign policy from leaning too far in a single direction.  
As the socialist regimes in Russia and Eastern Europe began to crumble in 1990, 
concerns about the demise of socialism and the infiltration of western ideologies allowed 
conservatives in the government to gain the upper hand and Vietnam sought to improve 
relations with China as a replacement for Soviet socialist stewardship. This resulted in the 
normalization of relations between the two countries in 1991. With the upper hand, the 
conservative elements, which dominate the military and security apparatus, approached 
China for more specific commitments; including security guarantees in the form of a 
military alliance. But, these offers were snubbed by China. The inability to establish 
socialist solidarity, and the uncertainty that it created in Vietnam, allowed the 
modernizers to regain influence.82  In 1997, the Asian financial crisis struck the region. 
Three of Vietnam’s largest trading and investment partners, Japan, South Korea and 
Taiwan were significantly affected and Vietnam was unable to sustain its high GDP 
growth rate.83  This dealt a significant blow to the modernizers’ export driven economic 
model and led to the replacement of moderate Do Muoi with Le Kha Phieu as the CPV 
General Secretary, who pursued a hard-line policy of anti-imperialism in domestic and 
foreign affairs.84  This shifted Vietnamese foreign policy back toward favoring China as 
a model for anti-imperialism, but Vietnamese proposals that supported establishing closer 
relations with China were again snubbed by Beijing, and so the policy shifted toward 
strengthening other foreign relationships by the early 2000s.85 
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C. VIETNAM’S TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY FOREIGN RELATIONS 
The changing political environment in the Pacific has begun to challenge this 
framework. By comparing Vietnam’s foreign policies in the first half of the decade with 
those in the second, it is easy to see an increased urgency in their relations with regional 
powers other than China that coincides with the growing threat to Vietnamese economic 
security that China’s increasingly aggressive behavior represents.  
At the same time, Vietnam’s continued economic growth following the recovery 
from the Asian financial crisis has, to some degree, marginalized those within the 
Vietnamese leadership in favor of more conservative policies. Additionally, due to 
China’s growing assertiveness over territorial claims, it is becoming harder for the 
conservatives to view China as the anti-imperialist power or the ideological alternative to 
counter western encroachment. Instead, Chinese economic and territorial encroachment is 
creating a possibility for alignment between modernizers and conservatives in the VCP 
that could reduce domestic constraints and facilitate a larger shift in Vietnamese foreign 
policy. In line with this idea, in 2003, Vietnam adopted the “Strategy of Fatherland 
Defense in a New Situation,” which changed how Vietnam defined external threats. 
Under the policy, support for Vietnam’s goals, not shared ideology, was the primary 
criteria for identifying Vietnam’s friends.  
Increasing Chinese offensive power and the reduction of domestic constraints 
would be predicted to push Vietnam into more clearly defined balancing behavior against 
China. The following sections validate that the prediction but show how it has manifested 
in a unique way..  
1. 2000–2005 
In the early portion of the twenty-first century, Vietnam continued the relatively 
wide-ranging development of its foreign relations that it had begun in the early 1990s. 
With the United States, Vietnam began exchanging high-level visits in 2001, when 
President Clinton became the first U.S. President to travel to Vietnam since the war. 
Having already lifted trade embargos on Vietnam and allowing the IMF and the World 
Bank to resume lending to Vietnam in the 1990s, the United States further expanded its 
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economic relationship with Vietnam in December of 2001 by signing a Bilateral Trade 
Agreement (BTA).86  The BTA expanded the trade between the United States and 
Vietnam by opening U.S. markets to the Vietnamese and reforming Vietnam’s 
commercial and legal systems, and provided another step in fostering the growing 
relationship between the states. In 2000, Vietnam authorized the opening of a USAID 
office in Hanoi, which, over the last decade has provided over $330 million in 
humanitarian and development aid, making Vietnam one of the largest recipients of U.S. 
aid in Asia.87 
Despite a slow start, the U.S.-Vietnam security relationship during this time also 
began to take hold. Initial approaches for military exchanges by the United States in the 
late 1990s were met with reluctance in Vietnam. POW/MIA issues were the primary 
focus of early discussions but by the end of the decade these talks included subjects such 
as military medicine and science, as well as disaster relief.88  This initial reluctance was 
likely due to both the more conservative elements in the Vietnamese government gaining 
power after the Asian financial crisis and the dominance of these leaders in the military 
establishment. In 2000, during a visit by the U.S. Secretary of Defense, the Vietnamese 
Defense Minister agreed to allow U.S. ship visits to Vietnam.89  In 2003, the USS 
Vandegrift conducted the first of these visits to Ho Chi Minh City since the war. This 
visit, and the Vietnamese Defense Minister’s trip to Washington, DC in the same month, 
began a series of successes in promoting a military relationship, and by 2004, the United 
States and Vietnam conducted the first annual defense dialogue. 
Chinese and Vietnamese relations proceeded similarly. Following the 
normalization of relations in 1991, both countries began diplomatic work to settle 
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maritime and land disputes. In 1999, they came to an agreement on the land border and in 
2000 an agreement was reached on the maritime boundaries in the Gulf of Tonkin but not 
in the South China Sea.90  In that same year, China and Vietnam also issued a Joint 
Statement for Comprehensive Cooperation in the New Century that outlined a structure 
for advancing future cooperation.91  Since that time, the relationship between the two 
countries grew, the two signed over 100 state-level agreements concerning economic, 
diplomatic and military cooperation, and conducted regular annual visits between senior 
leaders and exchanging over 100 lower level party delegations each year.92  Party-to-
party relations helped to drive much of this cooperation through regular meetings.93   
Military cooperation between the two countries was more modest. Contrary to the 
cooperative framework agreements China signed with Thailand, Malaysia, Brunei, 
Singapore, the Philippines and Laos, the agreement signed with Vietnam failed to include 
a reference to security cooperation. Instead, it included a joint statement claiming that 
“both sides will refrain from taking any action that might complicate and escalate 
disputes, resorting to force or making threats with force.”94   This vague arrangement 
provided a weak foundation for the growth of military ties, and there was very little 
development.  
While the focus of this chapter is on the Vietnamese relationship with China and 
the United States, given their dominant role in the Pacific, it is worth noting some of 
Vietnam’s other foreign policy actions during that time. Vietnam continued its long-time 
relationship with India. Most of this cooperation in the late 1990s and early 2000s was 
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economic in nature and designed to encourage trade. Still, in 2000, the Indian Defense 
Minister visited Vietnam and signed a defense cooperation agreement that outlined 
information sharing initiatives and plans for joint naval exercises and patrols.95  Vietnam 
deepened its relationship with its Southeast Asian neighbors by further integrating itself 
into ASEAN and the ASEAN Free Trade Area. And, Vietnam’s relationship with Russia, 
while still guarded was given some new life through discussions over arms sales and 
military assistance. 
2. Growing Conflict in the South China Sea 
While Vietnamese leadership has been reluctant to describe China as a threat, the 
increasingly heated situation in the South China Sea presents an economic threat that 
Vietnam has been increasingly quick to point out. The South China Sea has been a long 
point of contention between the two states and discussions on the maritime boundaries 
began in 1995 but have been unsuccessful in resolving the issue.96 Vietnam agreed to a 
joint exploration agreement with China and the Philippines called the Joint Marine 
Seismic Undertaking (JMSU) in 2005, but it was not renewed after 2008 when domestic 
political pressure in the Philippines unraveled the agreement in 2008 and Vietnam has not 
sought out any similar agreements with the Chinese.97 
Chinese assertiveness toward Vietnamese claimed territory began to increase 
markedly in 2007. In April 2007, PLA(N) vessels detained four Vietnamese fishing boats 
operating in the Spratly Islands and in June, a Vietnamese fishing vessel was sunk and a 
Vietnamese fisherman killed by a PLA(N) vessel. Later that year, the PLA(N) conducted 
a naval exercise in the Paracel Islands adding further fuel to the fire and provoking 
renewed protests from Vietnam. Also in 2007, China designated Sansha City on Hainan 
Island as the administrative authority for the Paracels and Spratlys in an effort to bolster 
its claim of “irrefutable sovereignty,” provoking official and popular protests in 
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Vietnam.98  In 2008 and 2009 during a Chinese declared fishing ban from May to 
August, Chinese fishery vessels chased, boarded, ceased, and in one case, sank 
Vietnamese fishing vessels.99 These types of interactions continued in 2010 and escalated 
in 2011 to include Vietnamese Survey vessels. In May and June, Vietnam accused 
Chinese vessels of harassing a Vietnamese survey vessel and cutting both vessels survey 
cables before chasing them off. The heated exchange led both countries to conduct naval 
exercises in the area later that month.100   
Coinciding with this increased aggression, the Vietnamese leadership has placed a 
growing importance on developing the marine economy. In 2010, Vietnam’s Department 
for Sea and Islands Exploitation and Management, the agency responsible for 
coordinating the development of Vietnam’s maritime economy, stated that the 
contribution to Vietnam’s GDP from the marine economy was around 47%, and that by 
2020 it is expected to approach 55%.101  Vietnam’s most recent National Defense White 
Paper in 2009 claims that, “the complicated developments [in the South China Sea] so far 
have seriously affected many activities and the maritime economic development of 
Vietnam.”102  British Petroleum and Exxon Mobil both suspended efforts to jointly 
develop off shore gas fields with Vietnam in 2007 and 2008 when China objected and 
threatened the companies’ commercial operations in China. These companies have since 
reopened their talks with the Vietnamese government but China’s interference 
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complicates these negotiations.103  While remaining unconnected in official Vietnamese 
leadership statements, Chinese continued assertiveness and encroachment on Vietnam’s 
maritime sovereignty potentially threatens more than half of Vietnam’s future GDP. In 
this light, it is both an external threat to economic security and an internal threat to the 
legitimacy of the VCP, which is increasingly tied to economic growth. 
3. 2005–2011 
Having demonstrated the growing threat to Vietnam’s economic security in the 
second half of the last decade, this section will now discuss how that threat has affected 
Vietnamese foreign policy and resulted in a broad balancing strategy with the United 
States and other regional powers. Vietnamese-U.S. relations during the second half of the 
decade began with a 2005 visit to Washington DC by Vietnam’s Prime Minister and a 
visit to Vietnam the following year by President Bush. A series of high-level meetings 
between 2005 and 2008 resulted in a number of agreements concerning energy and 
technical cooperation, labor and aviation issues.104  The growth in economic cooperation 
between the United States and Vietnam expanded as well. In 2006, the U.S. Congress 
approved permanent normal trade relations with Vietnam, paving the way for Vietnam to 
join the WTO in January 2007. This increasing openness in economic ties has made the 
United States Vietnam’s largest export market, accounting for about 20% of all exports in 
2009.105   
Security cooperation has not only grown since 2005, Vietnam has begun raising 
initiatives for areas of cooperation indicating a new willingness to cooperate. In 2005, 
Vietnam agreed to participate in the U.S.’s International Military Education Training 
(IMET) program and has increased its participation steadily. Foreign military sales by the 
United States., and the pace of senior level visits, also began to pick up. Secretary 
Rumsfeld hosted a meeting with the Vietnamese Prime Minister in 2005 and visited 
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Hanoi in 2006. A senior PACOM service leader has visited Vietnam every year since 
2004 and the PACOM commander visited personally in 2004, 2006 and 2007. In 2008, 
the two countries began an annual Security Dialogue on Political, Security and Defense 
issues among civilian leaders. These dialogues have led to increased cooperation in 
peacekeeping, disaster relief, and search and rescue operations.106  As with Finland, 
Vietnam’s proximity to China potential exposes it to coercion by Beijing. In that light, 
the growth of these security engagements indicate that Vietnam may be more concerned 
about balancing the threat of China than it is with provoking it. 
 
Figure 2.   U.S. IMET Funding for Vietnam 
Corresponding to the increase of incidents in the South China Sea, 2010 marked a 
remarkable year in U.S. Vietnamese relations. In 2010, the U.S. and Vietnam conducted a 
joint naval exercise in the South China Sea focusing on damage control and search and 
rescue and U.S. Navy ship visits have increased as Vietnam has chosen to disregard the 
previously informal rule of “one ship visit per year.”107  In August of 2010, the United 
States and Vietnam held the first Defense Policy Dialogue, the first formalized venue for 
security discussions between military officials. Finally, in 2011, plans were laid that for 
Vietnamese officers to attend the National War College and the Naval War College.108  
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More notable, however, was Vietnam’s willingness to align with the United States in 
voicing concern over China’s behavior. In 2010, both Secretary of State Clinton and 
Secretary of Defense Gates visited Vietnam. During Secretary Clinton’s visit, Vietnam 
joined the United States and other Southeast Asian nations in collectively registering their 
concern over Chinese behavior in the South China Sea at the ASEAN Regional Forum 
and repeated that sentiment at the recent East Asia Summit.  
While party-to-party relationships between Vietnam and China have continued 
relatively steady, the official relationship has been less productive. The greatest area of 
growth has been their economic relationship. Total trade between the two countries has 
grown from $3 million in 2000 to $23.1 billion in 2010, an average of 33.95% growth per 
year.109  By contrast U.S. trade with Vietnam, while still substantial, was less than $16 
billion in 2009, although Vietnam currently enjoys a surplus in its trade with the United 
States of nearly $8 billion.110  A great deal of diplomatic energy between the two 
countries during the last several years has been dedicated to crisis management as 
disputes have arisen. This has resulted in few major agreements. In 2008, at a party 
summit, the two countries elevated their relationship to a strategic partnership and in 
2009, a strategic cooperative partnership.111 
Sino-Vietnamese security cooperation continued its plodding development as 
well. In 2005 the two countries conducted their first defense security consultations, but it 
wasn’t until 2010 that they conducted their first Strategic Defense Security Dialogue.112  
As they have been with the United States, Vietnam has been cautious about operational 
interactions with Chinese forces. In 2006, China and Vietnam began joint navy patrols in  
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the Gulf of Tonkin. These patrols have been conducted twice a year, usually involving a 
PLA(N) frigate and one or two Vietnamese patrol craft, but there have been no further 
discussions about expanding these patrols.  
Vietnam’s relationships with other regional powers grew during this period. 
Though relations with Russia remain modest, Russia has been awarded the first contract 
for a nuclear power plant in exchange for military arms sales. India continues to work to 
assist Vietnam with upgrading its existing Soviet equipment has conducted occasional 
military exercises with Vietnam. Japan has been awarded the contract for two additional 
nuclear power plants in Vietnam and has been Vietnam’s primary source for development 
assistance, and access to technology. South Korea has also emerged as a partner with 
Vietnam through both development assistance and as the hub of Vietnam’s shipbuilding 
industry.113 
4. Vietnamese Internal Balancing 
If Vietnam truly began balancing against China in the second half of the last 
decade, in addition to external balancing, the theory predicts that it would also internally 
balance. The results, however, are inconclusive. Vietnam has worked to modernize and 
expand its military force, but the pace of this modernization has not been extraordinary. 
In the years following the withdrawal of Soviet support for Vietnam, without external 
funding or an immediate threat to justify spending, the military was allowed to languish 
in relative mediocrity. By the mid-1990s, Vietnamese economic growth enabled Hanoi to 
begin addressing this deficiency. Its first steps were focused on rebuilding is naval and air 
forces. With Russian assistance, Vietnam upgraded 34 SU-22s airframes and acquired 
four Molniya-class corvettes. In 2000, Vietnam signed a Defense Co-operation 
Agreement with India that included a provision for overhauling Vietnam’s MiG aircraft 
and purchased 10 additional Su-22s from the Czech Republic in 2004. Vietnam’s most 
recent round of purchases occurred in the last several years. In keeping with its 
diplomatic efforts, Vietnam has sought to diversify its sources of foreign military 
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equipment. It has placed orders with Canada and Poland for maritime patrol aircraft, and 
with France for the development and launch of a communications satellite. Russia 
however remains Vietnam’s primary source for military hardware. Vietnam recently 
reached an agreement with Russia to obtain six Kilo-class diesel submarines and eight 
Su-30 fighters.114   
Vietnam’s economic growth has allowed it to pursue these procurement measures. 
Vietnam has modestly increased military spending over the last decade while 
simultaneously reducing the percentage of GDP that Vietnam spends on its defense. As 
with China, it is difficult to determine Vietnam’s true military spending levels, but most 
observers believe that the true number is approximately twice what the Vietnamese 
government reports. Australia’s Defence Intelligence Office estimates that between 2000 
and 2007, the Vietnamese real defense budget grew from $2.7 billion to $3.1 billion (in 
2005 USD) while decreasing from 6.2% of GDP to 5.2%. Inflation and the global 
economic crisis greatly reduced defense spending in 2008, dropping the defense budget 
to 2000 levels. But, as the Vietnamese economy has recovered, defense spending levels 
have resumed their previous levels and appear to be on the rise.115  
Compared to the other Southeast Asian nations, Vietnam’s total military spending 
ranks fifth behind Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. In terms of the portion 
of GDP spent on defense, however, Vietnam led Southeast Asia in that category until 
2008 when it slipped below Singapore. It remained number two at 2.3% of GDP as of 
2010, but as the below chart shows, Vietnam’s initial emergence from its economic woes 
in 2011 is likely to lead to a renewed focus on modernization and increased spending.116 
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Figure 3.   Vietnam’s Estimated Military Spending in 2005 USD 
D. CONCLUSION 
Vietnam’s behavior since the early 1990s validates some of the ideas laid out in 
the opening chapter. After withdrawing from Cambodia, the external threat environment 
relaxed and allowed Vietnam the flexibility to entertain a wider range of foreign policies 
to negotiate the arrangements that were most beneficial to Vietnam’s need for expanded 
economic growth. The success of these policies also reduced the constraints on 
Vietnamese policies by marginalizing the more conservative elements of Vietnamese 
leadership, further spurring this expansive foreign policy. However, as the Chinese threat 
to Vietnamese economic security and sovereignty has grown, Vietnam has not reacted 
entirely as predicated.  
Vietnam’s external balancing against China is subtler than predicted and presents 
some new ideas for interpreting the theories. Since the emergence of China’s most 
assertive behavior in 2007, Vietnam has certainly grown closer to the United States, but it 
does not approach the type of alignment that would be expected. This result can be 
accounted for in a couple of ways. First, Walt’s theory predicts which states others will 
balance against. It does not predict who they will balance with, beyond the fact that the 
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other state must, by definition, be less threatening. In a bipolar world like the one in 
which Walt composed his theory, it is an either-or proposition. In a multi-polar structure 
though, there is increased flexibility and states are not forced to choose a single partner to 
balance with. This has allowed Vietnam to adopt a more distributed balancing approach 
by picking and choosing the most beneficial arrangements from a number of regional 
powers to balance China’s growing influence while mitigating the risk of abandonment or 
entrapment.117  From the United States, Vietnam gains security and economic assistance, 
from Russia, military arms, from India the friendship of an increasingly powerful country 
on the immediate periphery of China, and from Japan and South Korea economic and 
technological development assistance. As a whole, these arrangements represent a pretty 
significant balancing posture toward China.  
Yet, balancing typically implies a distancing from the threatening power that is 
not as evident in this case. While Vietnam’s diplomatic and security engagement with 
China has slowed, it has not stopped and economic relations continue to grow rapidly. 
The theory laid out in Chapter I presents the rearrangement of relationships as a 
bargaining strategy, whereby states attempt to develop new relationships before severing 
the old. In this light it would seem that Vietnam has not yet been able to attain the 
acceptable levels of integration with its balancing partners, especially in the economic 
realm to make up for the loses it would incur in severing its relationships with China. 
These efforts to find alternative arrangements will become increasingly difficult as the 
coercive effect of China’s proximity and power creates a situation in which Vietnam 
must increasingly take into account Chinese response to Vietnamese initiatives for 
external cooperation, and therefore, constrains Vietnam’s balancing behavior.  
In terms of internal balancing, Vietnam’s actions have not been as predicted. The 
Vietnamese acquisition program certainly seems aggressive in terms of the types of 
capabilities Vietnam is seeking to incorporate, but defense spending has not increased as 
significantly as would be expected. In fact, spending is just now approaching the levels of 
the early part of the decade. Certainly, the global economic crisis and high Vietnamese 
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inflation account for some of this, but defense spending as a portion of GDP has dropped 
as well in the past decade. The reasons for this are unclear. The political infighting 
between the modernizers and the conservatives cannot account for it as both groups tend 
to support the military modernization efforts. Vietnam’s external balancing also cannot 
explain it. While the security relationships have grown, none provide the strong guarantee 
of Vietnamese security that would be required to account for Vietnam’s low levels of 
internal balancing. The real emergence of the threat in 2007 at a time of economic 
downturn certainly complicates this analysis. It is possible that as the Vietnamese 
economy emerges from its slump, assuming the external conditions remain, defense 
spending may begin to grow at a faster rate. If military spending increases do not occur 
though, the theory outlined in Chapter I will need to be re-examined to explain this 
deficiency. It may also be interesting to look at how inability to internally balance, due to 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 63 
V. SINGAPORE 
Singapore’s foreign policy since its independence is a product of a sense of 
vulnerability that comes from its small size, lack of resources and its perceptions of 
external threat. Overcoming its vulnerability and ensuring its security has been the almost 
singular focus in its relations with other countries under the stewardship of an elite few. 
But, a single priority does not mean that Singapore’s foreign policy has been static. As 
the threats to its survival have changed, Singapore has altered its foreign policy to 
balance against them in an extraordinarily flexible and highly pragmatic manner. In its 
early years of independence, its policies focused on countering the threat from its 
immediate neighbors, Indonesia and Malaysia, through broad international engagement to 
gain recognition for its sovereignty and efforts to develop it military. As relations with 
those countries stabilized and communism spread in Southeast Asia, its policies shifted to 
counter that threat by aligning with its fellow ASEAN members, as well as the United 
States, and to a limited extent, China. The end of the Cold War and the rise of China 
present a new situation for Singapore. Singapore’s resolution of its regional conflict, its 
lack of historical conflict with China, and the comfortable distance that it enjoys allows 
Singapore to view the rise of China as an opportunity rather than a threat. Because of that 
perception, Singapore is relatively free to negotiate state-to-state relationships that most 
benefit Singapore and provide it with the greatest opportunity for gain without the 
constraints of domestic politics or overriding external security concerns. 
A. LACK OF INTERNAL CONSTRAINTS 
A single party, the People’s Action Party, has governed Singapore since its 
independence in 1965. Inside that party, Lee Kuan Yew and an elite few have been 
responsible for formulating Singapore’s foreign policy. As Narayanan Ganesan has 
stated, “The security discourse in Singapore is monopolized by a small group of political 
leaders and the bureaucratic elite. Their definition of security is generally not 
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contested.”118  Singapore’s leaders used the uncertainty of Singapore’s international 
situation at independence to consolidate their control over foreign affairs and have 
repeatedly beat that drum as a means of justifying their control, arguing that the highly 
centralized decision making allows Singapore to respond more efficiently and effectively 
to potential crisis.119  Thus, it has virtually eliminated the domestic political impact on 
foreign policy. The result is that, foreign policy decisions are made by an elite few based 
exclusively on their perceptions of the threats facing Singapore. This long-standing 
control by a small number of leaders and the minuscule influence of domestic politics has 
resulted in a remarkably consistent security policy that focuses on internal strengthening 
and external engagement to counter its most dominant threats.  
B. COLD WAR AND POST-COLD WAR 
1. Post-Independence 
In the early days of Singapore’s independence, its greatest threat was from its 
regional neighbors. In 1965, Singapore was expelled from the Federation of Malaysia 
after heated political and ethnic differences proved to be impossible to overcome. The 
acrimonious break with Malaysia to the north and the ongoing policy of Konfrontasi by 
Indonesia to the south left Singapore surrounded by potentially hostile forces. 
Konfrontasi ended a year later, but the peace agreement reached between Indonesia and 
Malaysia excluded Singapore and stressed the “common Malay blood-brotherhood” 
between the two states, creating a dangerous situation for Chinese dominated 
Singapore.120  Thus, “the new state began its independent existence with a deep-seated 
and well-founded mistrust of its nearest neighbors,” that has never been completely 
forgotten.121    
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The most immediate ways in which Singapore could counter the threat posed by 
its neighbors was through external engagement and internal balancing. To develop its 
armed forces, Singapore first looked to India and Egypt for assistance but both states 
were reluctant to help for fear of offending Malaysia. In the end, it entered into an 
agreement with Israel. Israeli doctrine and tactics were ideally suited to Singapore’s size 
and situation and Singapore was able to create a capable force that was able to deter 
regional aggression in its early and uncertain days.122  During the 1960s and 1970s, 
Singapore spent between 25% and 38% of the national budget on defense spending and 
expanded the army from two infantry battalions to two brigades, which included infantry, 
armor and artillery elements. It also developed a small though capable air force and navy 
with the assistance of the British.123 
Singapore’s policy of external engagement was not intended so much to balance 
against the threat from Malaysia and Indonesia directly as it was to secure international 
recognition of its sovereignty. These early endeavors are worth a closer examination as 
they demonstrate the flexibility and pragmatism of Singapore’s alignment choices and 
point to early evidence of Singapore’s reluctance to tie interests too closely with a single 
power.124  To gain support for its membership in the United Nations by the Soviet Union 
and the growing nonaligned movement, Singapore adopted a notably anti-U.S. position in 
1965. Lee Kuan Yew publicly revealed details about a 1960 CIA attempt to bribe a 
member of the security service in Singapore and gave repeated assurances that the United 
States would be denied access to Singapore’s bases. Once its sovereignty was recognized 
by the United Nations, however, it rapidly altered its position on the United States. The 
focus of its engagement became encouraging regional involvement by “a benign 
superpower that can protect the interests of vulnerable states.”125  To that end, in 1967,  
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only two years after his earlier anti-U.S. statements, Lee Kuan Yew travelled to the 
United States for a meeting where he publicly expressed Singapore’s support for the U.S. 
efforts in Vietnam.126 
Singapore was successful in warding off aggression from its neighbors, but the 
threat from Indonesia and Malaysia continued to take center stage in Singaporean 
strategic thinking. Singapore’s ethnic Chinese majority, and its choice of Israel as its 
partner in developing the Singapore Armed Forces, was not looked upon fondly by the 
Muslim leaders in Indonesia. Singapore was also highly dependent on Malaysia. Its small 
size prevented it from being able to provide all of its own water and so it relied on 
Malaysia to provide over half of the city-states water supply and a large portion of its 
food. This dependence created a significant vulnerability for Singapore.127  Despite these 
issues, Singapore was able to successfully manage its relationships without war. In 1967, 
with the fall of Sukarno and a lessening of the threat from Indonesia, Singapore became 
one of the founding members of ASEAN along with Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
and Thailand. Though the move pushed Singapore into greater alignment with its 
regional threats and Singapore was leery of the organization, it forced Malaysia and 
Indonesia to formally recognize Singapore’s sovereignty.128   
As the threat from Singapore closest neighbors began to decline, it was replaced 
by the threat of the spread of communism in Southeast Asia and the Soviet influence in 
Vietnam. To counter this threat, Singapore chose to align more closely with the United 
States. Singapore began a formal diplomatic relationship with the United States in 1965 
that rested on a foundation of mutual concern over the spread of communism in Southeast 
Asia. Singapore saw the United States as a counter balance to communist influence in 
Indochina and the growing Soviet naval presence in the region. Singapore actively 
encouraged U.S. presence in South East Asia by providing R&R facilities to U.S. soldiers  
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in Vietnam and voicing support for the U.S. presence in the Philippines and it grew 
gravely concerned by Nixon’s establishment of the Guam Doctrine in 1969 and the U.S. 
withdrawal from Vietnam in 1973. 
Singapore’s relationship with China during the same period was clouded by 
China’s ideological support for internal communist movements in Singapore and 
Malaysia that threatened the government’s legitimacy. Additionally, Singapore worried 
that the a close association with China would raise regional concerns in its Malay 
neighbors that Singapore was acting as an “agent of China” due to its Chinese ethnic 
majority and therefor increase the external threats.129  For those reasons, Singapore 
distanced itself from China, and its early engagement with Beijing was mostly on 
economic issues and was conducted through a branch of the Bank of China in Singapore.  
It was not until the 1970s that the relationship began to change. By then the 
international stance on China had begun to soften and the United States began to view 
China as a counter-weight to the Soviet Union. Singapore voted for the PRCs admission 
to the United Nations in 1971 and Singapore’s Foreign Minister conducted the first 
diplomatic visit to Beijing in 1975. That visit was followed a year later by Lee Kuan Yew 
and a reciprocal visit was conducted by Deng Xiaoping in 1978. The timing of this 
engagement is important. As was pointed out earlier, U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam and 
the declaration of the Guam doctrine generated concerns in Singapore about the growing 
Communist influence in Southeast Asia. The shrinking U.S. presence brought into 
question whether the United States remained a legitimate balancing force, and Singapore 
had few other legitimate options that could counter the strength of a Soviet supported 
Vietnam or the potential emergence of a hostile Indonesia. This again point to the 
importance of not only availability but also the credibility of existing balancing partners. 
2. The Cambodia Conflict and the End of the Cold War 
The invasion of Cambodia by Vietnam greatly simplified Singapore’s strategic 
calculus. It helped to solidify the ASEAN members under a common cause, and 
overshadowed individual bilateral disputes between the members, allowing them to be 
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resolved peacefully. It also aligned China’s strategic goals with those of Singapore and 
ASEAN. Additionally, it drew the United States back into involvement in Southeast Asia 
through arms and funding for the Khmer groups fighting the Vietnamese installed 
government in Phnom Penh.130  By reestablishing its presence in the region, the United 
States again became a legitimate balancing partner for Singapore 
The withdrawal of Soviet support from Vietnam, accompanied by Vietnam’s doi 
moi policies and withdrawal of forces from Cambodia lessened the threat posed by 
communist expansion in Southeast Asia at the end of the 1980s. This paved the way for 
Singapore’s closer alignment with its Southeast Asian neighbors through expansion of 
ASEAN in the 1990s. During this same period, the two primary constraints on 
Singapore’s closer alignment with China were at least partially lifted. The first constraint 
was China’s continued support of communist insurgencies which internally threatened 
Singapore. Under China’s reform program begun in China in 1978, China scaled back its 
support for insurgencies, and by the mid-1980s, they had stopped. The second constraint 
was the concern about regional reactions to a closer relationship with China. As an 
example of this constraint, during Lee Kuan Yew’s first visit to China in 1976, “Lee 
made a point of only speaking in English on all official occasions in a conspicuous 
attempt to refute the charge that Singapore was a third China.”131  This concern was the 
primary reason for Singapore’s delay in normalizing its relationship with China. Malaysia 
had done so in 1974 but Singapore made a point of waiting until Indonesia did the same 
before following in 1990. These developments significantly relaxed Singapore’s threat 
situation. While uncertainty still remained, there was no clearly defined threat to balance 
away from. This allowed Singapore some diplomatic space to expand its engagements. Its 
lack of security threats allowed to bargain more effectively since it was not dependent on 
or committed to any particular relationship for security.132 
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The end of the Cold War, and the withdrawal of Vietnam from Cambodia, did not 
perceptibly change Singapore’s attitudes toward U.S. engagement in the region though. 
Lee Kuan Yew still viewed an American presence in Southeast Asia as beneficial and 
necessary to ensure the freedom of navigation, so critical to Singapore’s economy, and 
there were few other options to achieve this. Amidst the troubled negotiations between 
the United States and Philippines over the lease extension for basing facilities, Singapore 
and the United States signed an MOU in 1990 that allowed the United States military to 
use air and port facilities in Singapore and authorized the U.S. Navy’s Pacific Logistics 
Command to establish permanent facilities there a year later. The SAF also began to 
conduct military exercises with the United States in 1994, beginning with the 
Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) naval exercises. 
While Singapore’s goals remained the same, the end of the Cold War did result in 
a change in U.S. priorities that colored Singapore’s perception of the United States to a 
degree. U.S. foreign policy shifted from the containment of Communism to expanding 
liberal democracy. Some in Singapore saw this as President Clinton’s effort to “find a 
new enemy.”133  With this change Singapore came under fire for its single party rule, and 
its controls on political freedoms, the judiciary and the media. The dispute was further 
fueled in 1994 by the caning of an American teenager for vandalism. In 1995, Prime 
Minister Goh Chok Tong was denied access to the White House during a trip to the 
United States for a speech at Williams College. Adding to this tension, the United States’ 
delay in recognizing and dealing with the Asian Financial crisis in 1997 drew criticism 
from Singapore and other Asian nations, and its use of the IMF and World Bank to force 
changes in some Asian economies, generated outright resentment in Asia. While these 
disputes did not rupture the bilateral relationship between Singapore and the United 
States, they did serve to raise questions about the inviolability of it, and again, brought 
into question the reliability of the United States as a balancing partner.  
Relations between Singapore and China in the 1990s continued with their heavy 
focus on economic cooperation, and in 1993, they agreed on the joint development of an 
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industrial park in Suzhou. Singapore’s leaders also began to express a new affinity for 
Chinese culture during the mid-1990s as a way to counter what it viewed as an 
increasingly corrosive Western liberal influence in Singaporean society. To that end, they 
encouraged the use of Mandarin and expounded on the value of Confucian ethics. This 
represented not only a growing cultural connection between the two states but also a 
lessening of concern with the reaction from Indonesia and Malaysia, whose relationships 
with China were also growing. Along with these successes, there were some diplomatic 
stumbles. In 1995, Singapore’s Prime Minister voiced concerns over the Chinese seizure 
of Mischief Reef, and in 1996 Lee Kuan Yew cautioned China after it launched missile 
near Taiwan in an effort to influence Taiwan’s election.134  But, by the turn of the 
century, Singapore had begun to discuss new avenues for cooperation and relations were 
generally positive. 
In a discussion of Singapore’s relationship with China, it is important to also 
characterize its relations with Taiwan. Singapore has recognized a one China policy since 
its independence but its policies toward Taiwan have been complicated by its relationship 
with China. Within a week of Singapore’s expulsion from the Malaysian Federation, 
Taipei officially recognized Singapore’s statehood. Singapore welcomed the recognition 
but did not officially reciprocate. Relations remained cordial however, and in 1967 
Singapore entered into secret discussions with Taipei to allow air force pilots and naval 
officers to train in Taiwan. This resulted in a 1975 agreement to establish Project 
Starlight, a program for conducting maintenance, infantry, artillery and armored training 
inside Taiwan and allowing extended tours for SAF helicopter detachments. Military 
discussions led to enhanced economic and diplomatic relations. Taiwan established the 
Office of Trade Representative of the Republic of China in Singapore in 1969, and Lee 
Kuan Yew conducted his first visit to Taiwan in 1973. These visits were conducted on an 
annual basis until 1988 although they remained secret until 1985.  In the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, a change in leadership in Taiwan brought about increased hostilities between 
Beijing and Taipei. Singapore attempted to ease tensions through bilateral engagement 
and attempts to mediate the conflicts. In 1993, it hosted Cross-Strait talks but there were 
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few tangible results and the animosity remained. By the end of the 1990s, Singapore’s 
recognition of the importance of China and the leadership’s growing irritation over 
Taiwan’s political antics brought about a cooling in relations with Taipei.135 
The preceding analysis demonstrates that Singapore’s Cold War and early post-
Cold War foreign policies were based on finding pragmatic solutions to the challenges 
that faced them. Singapore’s leaders have not been constrained by domestic politics or 
ideological considerations, and with the continued dominance of the People’s Action 
Party, that is unlikely to change. What are changing are the challenges. Its priorities have 
historically been based around mitigating threats from its neighbors through self-
strengthening and engagement with great powers. In its early years, its affinity for 
nonalignment was a product of its need for recognition. Once that was secured, it shifted 
toward a policy of encouraging U.S. involvement in the region prompted by the threat 
from Soviet expansion into Southeast Asia. At the end of the Cold War, it continued to 
pursue relations with the United States out of both institutional inertia, and a sense of 
uncertainty rather than as a way of balancing against a specific threat.  
C. SINGAPORE’S TWENTY FIRST CENTURY RELATIONS 
The last decade brought about considerable changes, especially in Asia. The 
balance of power has begun to shift, as discussed in Chapter III. There has also been 
steady improvement in Singapore’s relations with Malaysia and Indonesia through the 
continued success of ASEAN, which both diminishes the perceived threat from these 
countries and reduces the constraints it placed in the past on Singapore’s relationship 
with China. In fact, there are no immediate threats to Singapore’s security. While Chinese 
power is growing, its lack of aggressive intentions and geographic separation from 
Singapore make it only an indirect threat to Singapore if its actions create instability or  
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interrupt the flow of commerce. In this environment, and led by rational pragmatic 
leaders, Singapore has sought out the relationships that provide it with the greatest 
benefit, not necessarily the greatest security. 
Having long pursued trade relations with both the United States and China, 
Singapore’s trade policies toward those countries did not shift significantly in the last 
decade. It has signed free trade agreements with both countries (in 2004 with the United 
States and in 2008 with China). But, there is a growing discrepancy in the trade and 
investment between each dyad. In 2000, Singapore’s two-way trade with the United 
States was around $76 billion and had increased to $78 billion in 2010, with a high of $90 
billion in 2006. In contrast, Singapore’s trade with China has grown from $22 billion to 
$95 billion in the same time period to become Singapore’s second largest trading partner 
behind Malaysia.  
Singapore has also found China to be a useful destination for excess capital. Its 
foreign direct investment in China grew from $16 billion in 2000 to almost $60 billion in 
2009 and accounted for nearly 16% of Singapore’s total FDI abroad. By comparison, the 
United States’ received only $12 billion in FDI in 2009, up from $6 billion in 2000. U.S. 
FDI into Singapore in 2009 of $57 billion still dwarfs China’s contribution of $9.3 billion 
but the Chinese role continues to grow, and if you factor in Chinese investment from 
Hong Kong of $15.4 billion, the disparity becomes smaller.136  Singapore and China 
continue to explore further industrial park development in China and Singapore maintains 
provincial business councils in seven Chinese provinces. Chinese companies are 
establishing operations in Singapore as well, and as of 2008, Chinese banks are allowed 
to invest in Singapore stocks.137  These numbers demonstrate Singapore’s growing 
reliance on the Chinese economy to sustain Singapore’s economic growth. They are not 
so much a product of government economic policies, though the Singaporean government 
                                                 
136 Singapore Department of Statistics, Yearbook of Statistic Singapore, 2011, (Singapore: Ministry of 
Trade and Industry, Republic of Singapore), available at www.singstat.gov.sg. 
137 K. Kesavapany, “ASEAN’s Political and Security Development and Singapore-China Relations,” 
Paper Presented to Third China-Singapore Forum (April 17–18, 2008). 
 73 
does encourage Chinese investment, but they do reflect the growing appeal of China’s 
larger market and its geographic proximity to Singaporean investors.138   
Despite the occasional row with Singapore over human rights and political 
freedoms in the 1990s, the United States’ still maintained a strong diplomatic relationship 
with Singapore in 2000. But, the terrorist attacks on 9/11 once again altered U.S. 
priorities in region. It immediately shifted its attention toward operations in Afghanistan 
and prosecuting the Global War on Terror. Singapore was briefly engaged in these efforts 
when a terrorist cell that planned to attack U.S. citizens at an MRT station was uncovered 
in Singapore in December 2001, but the United States concentrated its efforts in 
Southeast Asia on Jemaah Islamiyah cells and their supporters in Indonesia, Malaysia and 
the Philippines. While these policies were well received in the Philippines, the war on 
terror was viewed by Indonesia, and to some degree by Malaysia, as largely a war on the 
Muslim religion. This animosity complicated Singapore’s close association with the 
United States. Diplomatic exchanges between the two countries slowed during this period 
and Singapore’s leaders expressed frustration with the United States. As the war on terror 
began to transform into a pursuit to spread liberal democracy with the invasion of Iraq in 
2003, the United States renewed the liberal democracy rhetoric from the 1990s that had 
irritated Singapore’s leaders. The beginning of troop withdrawals in Iraq and Afghanistan 
allowed the United States to reengage with Southeast Asia and improved diplomatic 
relations with Singapore, but actions like the 2010 addition of Singapore to the State 
Department’s human trafficking watchlist continue to hinder relations and bring into 
question the United States’ dependability as a balancing partner.  
Having gotten a much later start, Singapore’s diplomatic relationship with China 
was much less robust than its relationship with the United States at the turn of the century 
but while the United States prosecuted the war on terror, Chinese leaders engaged in a 
more active diplomacy with Singapore, and Singaporean leaders responded with 
enthusiasm. In 2000, China and Singapore signed a bilateral framework agreement 
calling for frequent high level exchanges and adherence to the basic norms of the UN 
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charter and the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, and throughout the last decade 
they have conducted frequent ministerial level meetings as well as working groups to 
discuss economic, cultural and security issues.139  In 2003, the two nations established 
the Joint Council Meeting for Bilateral Cooperation (JCBC) that brought bilateral 
cooperation efforts under one organization. Since that time, these exchanges have 
expanded and become more frequent. The two countries have signed agreements on 
educational cooperation, science and technology, cultural cooperation and the 
establishment of a Confucius Institute in Singapore. China continues to consult with 
Singapore on economic development issues and to study how Singapore’s ruling PAP 
party maintains power.140  In 2009, President Hu Jintao travelled to Singapore and met 
with Singapore’s leaders before the APEC summit. It was the first visit of a Chinese 
President to Singapore since 1994. During the visit, he called for a further advance in 
bilateral relations, and not insignificantly, agreed to loan Singapore two giant pandas in 
2011 to mark 20 years of Chinese Singapore relations.141  
Military cooperation in each of these bilateral relations is of particular note. The 
United States security relationship with Singapore remains robust. Singapore’s 
longstanding relationship with the U.S. Navy was strengthened in 2001 when it 
completed the facilities at Changyi Naval base that allowed U.S. Aircraft carriers to dock 
pier side, the only such facility in Southeast Asia. Following the attacks on 9/11, 
Singapore offered additional military support to the U.S. It has provided refueling and 
logistics support to coalition forces in the Arabian Gulf since 2003 and has small 
detachments that operate in Afghanistan alongside other coalition forces.142  It has also 
participated in counter piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, taking the rotating 
command of the task force in July 2011. 
                                                 
139 Carlyle A. Thayer, “China’s International Security Cooperation Diplomacy and Southeast Asia,” 
Southeast Asia and China: A North South Relationship of a New Kind (San Diego, CA, March 25, 2006). 
140 Kesavapany, “ASEAN’s Political and Security Development,” 7–9. 
141 Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy Northeast Asia, March 2011, 
http://www.mfa.gov.sg (accessed March 13, 2011). 
142 Jane’s Defence & Security Intelligence & Analysis, Singapore External Affairs, November 5, 
2010, 
http://jmsa.janes.com.libproxy.nps.edu/JDIC/JMSA/taxDrill.do?treeNode=0070+External+Affairs&treeNa
me=JdicCassRoot&isLastLevel=true (accessed March 16, 2011). 
 75 
Singapore continues to contribute forces for regional and bilateral exercises with 
the United States. Singapore participates in the U.S. led Southeast Asia Cooperation 
Against Terrorism (SEACAT) exercise with four other Southeast Asian nations that 
began in 2002 and focuses on maritime interception and cooperation. It continues to 
support Cope Tiger, a trilateral exercise with the United States and Thailand, and the 
Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercise expanded in 2010 to 
incorporate U.S. fast attack submarines for the first time.143  Singapore also maintains 
aircraft at various locations around the United States that it uses to conduct training and 
has purchased a number of advanced aircraft from the United States including the F-15, 
F-16 and AH-64.144  The two countries updated the 1990 MOU in 2005 signing a 
Strategic Framework Agreement that pledged cooperation on counter-proliferation and 
counter-terrorism and updated the renewed the 1990 agreement on the use of military 
facilities.145  Most recently they entered discussions on the stationing of two of the U.S. 
Navy’s Littoral Combat Ships at Changyi Naval Base. 
Singapore’s military engagement with China early on was limited. In the late 
1990s and early 2000s, there were few exchanges between the senior defense officials of 
either country and only three ship visit exchanges. In 2005, the Singapore Defense 
Minister visited China, his first visit since 1997.146   During that visit, and a reciprocal 
visit in 2006, they began to explore ways to enhance their bilateral military cooperation. 
These meetings led to the 2008 establishment of an annual China-Singapore Defense 
Dialogue and the signing of the first agreement for defense exchanges and security 
cooperation. The agreement formalized military operational and education exchanges, 
senior visits and reciprocal port calls and implemented humanitarian relief and disaster 
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assistance exchanges.147   This formal agreement was a major transition in the Sino-
Singapore defense relationship and led directly to a bilateral exercise in 2009, 
Cooperation 2009, in which 60 Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) personnel conducted 
counter-terrorism training with their PLA counterparts in southern China. The exercise is 
expected to be repeated and to grow in scale.148  Singapore has also hosted a number of 
PLAN and CMS vessels for training exchanges. Singapore and China continue to 
dialogue on ‘nontraditional’ security exchanges but, through frequent dialogues with 
China’s military and defense establishment, both sides have pledged to expand this 
relationship. 
It is finally worth exploring Singapore’s changing relationship with Taiwan for 
clues about how China is influencing Singapore in this area. Singapore’s military training 
arrangement with Taiwan reached its peak in the late 1990s but that relationship has 
dwindled since.149  In 2002, China offered Singapore the use of similar facilities on 
Hainan Island. Singapore turned this offer down, but since then it has made significant 
efforts to downplay what little training it still conducts on Taiwan.150  In 2003, there was 
speculation that Singapore had requested advanced notice of a PRC military operation 
against Taiwan in order to allow the SAF to relocate its forces that further enflamed 
relations with Taipei.151  In 2004, Beijing’s strong response to the visit of Singapore’s 
Prime Minister-designate Lee Hsien Loong to Taiwan shocked Singapore. In order to 
mend relations, Singapore’s Prime Minister made a statement warning that a move by 
Taiwan toward independence could start a war that would devastate Taiwan, which was 
later repeated by Singapore’s Foreign Minister at the UN General Assembly and 
generated protests from the Taiwan government. This was followed in 2005 by denying 
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two Taiwan frigates permission to conduct port calls in Singapore. The relationship 
between Taiwan and Singapore has improved with the 2008 election of Taiwan President 
Ma Ying-jeou and his policies of engagement with China, but the last decade is a 
testament to the growing influence that Beijing has exercised over Singapore’s 
relationship with Taiwan.  
D. CONCLUSION  
A look at the last decade shows that Singapore remains deeply interconnected 
with the U.S., but many of these areas of cooperation are carried over from their earlier 
relationship. Since 2000, Singapore’s political and economic relations with China show 
far greater relative growth and emphasis on the part of Singapore as a result of China’s 
increasing importance to Singapore’s economic strength. Singapore’s foreign policy, so 
long driven by overcoming vulnerability, cannot afford to ignore its growing economic 
vulnerability with respect to China and the shifting balance of power in Asia and is acting 
to negotiate the most beneficial arrangements available at a time when traditional threats 
have largely been mitigated.  
The ambiguity of Singapore’s policy toward China, so frequently described as 
hedging, is actually enabled by its geography. Singapore’s distance from both the United 
States and China has been to its advantage. Singapore is not viewed as a threat to either 
power, and that allows Singapore greater flexibility in its approach to both diplomatic and 
security relationships. Unlike Finland’s uncertain situation with the Soviet Union, the 
separation from both the United States and the PRC allows Singapore to expand its 
security relationship with both nations without threatening the other. It geographic 
distance also diminishes the threat posed by China which both encourages further 
engagement with China and allows Singapore to continue its relationship with the United 
States without fear of reprisals. This has allowed a slow and careful process of 
negotiating alignment while it watches which way the international winds are blowing. 
This demonstrates to the importance of proximity in determining threat as well in 
enabling diplomatic flexibility as Walt outlined in his discussion on bandwagoning. 
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Is this a viable long-term approach?  That is less certain and depends to a large 
degree on the relationship between the United States and China. If the relationship 
remains amicable, and the United States remains engaged in Asia, Singapore can 
continue to pursue this approach. In this context, it is interesting to note that despite its 
deep reservations about the Soviet Naval presence in Southeast Asia in the 1970s, it 
maintained a commercial relationship with the Soviet Union that included providing 
repair facilities for merchant vessels that supported the Soviet Pacific Fleet.152  This 
speaks again to the importance of geography and also to the practicality of Singapore’s 
foreign policy. As in the 1970s, these policies provide Singapore the best of both worlds, 
allowing it to pursue wider engagement while avoiding becoming entrapped or 
abandoned. The strategy balances Singapore concerns over a declining U.S. presence and 
its greatest fear about China, that it could “dissolve into anarchy” resulting in a refugee 
crisis and instability.153  In both cases, Singapore’s choice for alignment is clear. But, 
should conflict erupt, Singapore will find it difficult to continue straddling this line. Its 
importance to U.S. Naval operations in the Pacific will make it necessary to choose sides 
and from this analysis it is unclear which side it will come down on.  
A quote from Lee Kuan Yew in 1981 sums up Singapore’s current strategy as 
well. “In an imperfect world, we have to search for the best accommodation possible. 
And no accommodation is permanent. If it lasts long enough for progress to be made until 
the next set of arrangements can be put into place, let us be grateful for it.”154 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
This thesis has attempted to explain how Singapore and Vietnam are reacting to 
the change in the balance of power in Asia using a new framework. The framework 
adopted was based on the proposition that states balance against threats to their security. 
This outlined the motivation for balancing but the parsimonious nature of this theory left 
it lacking in real explanatory value as to how they balance or what actions they take when 
the threat is either uncertain or simply not present. To address this, additional conditions 
that influence both the speed and the nature of that balancing were applied. Threats do 
not typically emerge overnight. It characterizes alignment choices and alignment 
implementation as a negotiation between states, whereby, when states are confronted 
with a growing threat they engage with other states in an attempt to create the most 
beneficial alignment options to balance against the threat before beginning to abrogate 
the arrangements with the threatening state. As the threat grows larger, the urgency to 
negotiate these arrangements becomes greater and therefore states begin to fully behave 
as balance of threat would predict. In the absence of a threat or when a threat is uncertain, 
states are likely to distribute their alignment through broad international engagement. 
This allows them to seek out the most advantageous arrangements while avoiding settling 
on a particular alignment that may not be necessary and could leave the state entrapped or 
abandoned when a threat emerges or becomes more obvious  
Because these actions are not an immediate response and occur over time, they 
can be slowed by internal or external constraints. Internally, domestic politics can have 
some affect. While leadership changes in a state do not change the structure of the 
system, they can change the way that other state’s intentions are perceived, and therefore, 
lead states to identify different sources of threat as the most pressing. External constraints 
also make a difference in two ways. First, by looking at the alignment processes as a 
series of negotiations the existence of institutions becomes important. The need to not 
only identify new institutions that provide the same benefits as those enjoyed with the 
emerging threat and the difficulty in decoupling those institutions will slow states ability 
to balance against the threat. Finally, when threats emerge suddenly or states are slow to 
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take action to balance against a threat a state can be caught in a situation where the 
attempt to negotiate a new alignment is seen as too provocative toward the threat state. In 
this case, states can be severely constrained from balancing through coercive diplomacy 
by the threat state.  
Having developed this theory, it was then applied to the historical example of 
Finland, and then used to attempt to explain the policies of Vietnam and Singapore. In the 
following section, each case study is reviewed and the major takeaways are highlighted.  
A. FINLAND 
Finland’s World War II, Cold War and post-Cold War policies validate much of 
this theory. Chapter II finds that, fundamentally, Finland pursued policies that were 
intended to balance against the dominant threat but that these attempts were constrained 
in some of the ways laid out above. Its pre-World War II policy of engagement with both 
the Soviet Union and Germany demonstrate the importance of being able to identify the 
threat and also validates the idea that, in the absence of such clarity, states pursue the 
broadest possible engagement to prevent becoming entrapped or abandoned. The rapid 
changes in alignment in Finland’s World War II policies show how clearly defined and 
immediate threats reduce the importance of constraints. Finland’s Cold War policies are 
the most interesting test of this theory. At face value, Finland’s appeasement of the Soviet 
Union appears to be bandwagoning behavior. However, by looking at Finland’s policies 
throughout the Cold War, as Finland began to reach out to the West beginning in the 
1950 and slowly expanded that engagement over the next 40 years, Finland’s behavior 
can be interpreted as a severely constrained attempt to balance the Soviet Union. This 
confirms the idea that balancing against threats is the dominant motivating force in 
alignment and also questions the long-term resiliency of bandwagoning alignments. 
A final lesson learned from the examination of Finland concerns that way in 
which these alignment negotiations are undertaken. Perhaps it is a function of the 
coercive situation that Finland found itself in during the Cold War, but Finland’s efforts 
to align with the West proceeded in series of measured steps with one type of 
engagement leading to another. In Finland’s case it shows a hierarchy of foreign policies 
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that begins with diplomatic engagement, leading to economic engagement and finally to 
security cooperation. This demonstrates how the presence of a threat can restrict the 
flexibility of a state’s foreign policy due to fears of provoking the very power that states 
are attempting to balance against. 
B. VIETNAM 
The examination of Vietnam’s policies through this slightly altered viewpoint 
does much to contend with the often-used description of Southeast Asian foreign policy 
as hedging. Vietnam’s foreign policies coincide strongly with the ways in which balance 
of threat would predict but also offer new, somewhat different interpretations. Vietnam’s 
foreign policies in the years immediately after its unification demonstrate not only the 
influence of threats but also the importance of balancing options. Vietnam approached 
both the United States and the Soviet Union to negotiate changes in the alignment 
structure but found the first door closed and so chose to balance with the only legitimate 
choice available. Emerging from the Cold War, Vietnam found its external environment 
to be much less threatening. This not only enabled, but also encouraged Vietnam to 
expand the aperture of its foreign policy and negotiate the best possible alternatives to 
counter the economic problems that were becoming the largest threat to the Vietnamese 
leadership’s legitimacy. These efforts though were in many ways limited by the political 
wrangling between the conservatives and the modernizers. 
The efforts to counter that internal threat did not direct Vietnam toward a single 
balancing partner; it simply encouraged Vietnam to engage more broadly throughout 
most of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s. By the mid-2000s, however, as 
Chinese actions in the South China Sea began to threaten Vietnamese economic growth, 
Vietnam’s integration with countries like Russia, India, Japan and the United States 
deepened. Rather than balance against this growing threat with a specific balancing 
power, Vietnam chose a strategy of distributing its balancing arrangements among 




avoiding becoming dependent on a single power and becoming entrapped or abandoned. 
The growing multipolarity in the international system facilitated this choice, but it did not 
dictate it.  
C. SINGAPORE 
Singapore’s long-term alignment with the United States has become one of the 
cornerstones of its foreign policy. This alignment choice was driven initially to balance 
the threat of its immediate neighbors Malaysia and Indonesia and later to balance against 
the threat posed by the spread of communism and Soviet influence in Southeast Asia. Its 
choice of the United States as a balancing partner was a function of both the United 
States’ distance from Southeast Asia, which made it a more benign power, and a limited 
number of balancing options available. The only two options for balancing Soviet 
influence in Asia were the United States and China. But, while the Soviet threat 
dominated Singapore’s strategic considerations, regional concerns lingered and would 
have been intensified had Singapore thought to balance with China. Despite that, as the 
United States began its withdrawal from Southeast Asia in the mid-1970s, Singapore’s 
move toward China reflected the fact that the Soviet Union remained the dominant threat. 
That move also demonstrated the importance that the availability of credible alignment 
options in deciding how threats influence foreign policy. The United States involvement 
in countering the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia effectively restored that credibility 
and Singapore resumed its alignment with the United States.  
The end of the Cold War also brought an end to Vietnam’s occupation of 
Cambodia and the threat from communism that it embodied. Additionally, the deepening 
relationship of ASEAN helped to substantially lessen the threat posed to Singapore by 
Malaysia and Indonesia. This relaxation allowed Singapore to broaden its foreign policy 
and approach China for more formal arrangements without fear of regional reprisals. The 
growth of Chinese power in the last decade has done little to change this behavior. In 
fact, Singapore has expanded these efforts. Singapore’s physical distance from China and 
its lack of existing or historical disputes allow Singapore to view China as a relatively 
benign power, which does not threaten Singapore directly. In this context, relatively free 
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from internal or external threat, Singapore is able to pursue arrangements with other 
states that offer the greatest benefit. It has been able to continue its relationship with the 
United States, which offers Singapore the greatest security benefits at the least cost, while 
stepping up its economic engagement with China, which offers it the greatest economic 
benefit, without fear of drawing retribution from either power.  
D. IMPLICATIONS 
The analysis of these two states as well as the broader look at how alignments are 
negotiated provides several prescriptions for U.S. policy in Asia and the world. 
1. Importance of Balancing Alternatives 
In all three cases above, the choice of alignment was in some way shaped by the 
availability of alignment partners. Vietnam’s approach toward the Soviet Union and the 
United States as issues with China became an increasingly larger threat illustrate this. The 
lack of interest from the United States, driven primarily on a policy of communist 
containment, drove Vietnam toward the only credible balancing partner available. The 
same motivation drove Singapore toward a closer relationship with China in the mid-
1970s, only in this case the argument is more nuanced. The United States’ had not 
refused to continue its relationship with Singapore, nor had it lost any significant portion 
of its military capabilities. What the United States did lose, in Singapore’s eyes, was its 
perception as a credible balancing partner. The implication of this is obvious, and the 
Obama Administration seems to have come to the same conclusion. In order to present 
itself as a credible alternative balancing partner, and therefore encourage states that may 
come to view China as a threat to align with the United States, it must remain engaged in 
Asia. The United States complicates the strategic calculations of the states in the region 
when it becomes distracted or attempts to implement policies like linking trade with 
human rights that lead these states to question U.S. commitment and intentions. This in 
turn leads to a delay in the alignment process due to concerns about becoming 
abandoned.  
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2. Effect of Multi-polarity 
While the cases presented here examined alignment choice largely as choice 
between China and the United States, the growing multi-polarity of the international 
structure is increasingly broadening the options for states to choose when balancing 
against a threat. The case of Vietnam points to this in particular through its use of a more 
distributed system of balancing that does not rely on just a single power for security. 
Multi-polarity allows a greater range of alignment options and the growing preference for 
alignment over more formal alliances adds to this flexibility by reducing the institutional 
constraints created by more formalized structures. This growing availability of credible 
balancing options and the flexibility to choose among them may create delays in 
balancing behavior as states are disinclined to settle on a particular alignment 
arrangement when multiple options remain. This may also eventually lead to more 
transitory alignments of convenience that may reduce the dependability of the alignment 
partnership. For the United States, the implications for this are twofold. First, the 
potentially transitory nature of these alignments means that the United States cannot rest 
on its laurels in its existing alignments, nor should it shy away from seeking new 
arrangements with states that have been unresponsive in the past. The second implication 
is less prescriptive and more predictive. If states become increasingly inclined to pursue 
the type of relationships with the regional powers that Vietnam has, it may ultimately 
dilute overall U.S. influence, but it may also create the type of interdependence in 
security relations that is now more often discussed in terms of economics. 
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